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ABSTRACT. For decades, the Supreme Court has sharply divided in equal protection race
discrimination cases. As commonly described, the Justices disagree about whether the Equal
Protection Clause is properly interpreted through a colorblind anticlassification principle
concerned with individualism or through an antisubordination principle concerned with
inequalities in group status. This Article uncovers a third perspective on equal protection in the
opinions of swing Justices who have voted to uphold and to restrict race conscious remedies
because of concern about social divisiveness which, they believe, both extreme racial stratification
and unconstrained racial remedies can engender. The Article terms this third perspective on
equal protection concerned with threats to social cohesion the antibalkanization perspective.
Employing this triadic model of equal protection, the Article demonstrates how Justice
Kennedy reasons from antibalkanization values in the recent cases of Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. i and Ricci v. DeStefano. There Justice Kennedy
affirms race-conscious facially neutral laws that promote equal opportunity (such as disparate
impact claims in employment discrimination laws) so long as the enforcement of such laws does
not make race salient in ways that affront dignity and threaten divisiveness.
The Article's triadic model identifies alternative directions equal protection doctrine might
develop, and enables critique. A final section raises questions concerning the principle's logic and
application. Have those who interpret equal protection with attention to balkanization enforced
the principle in an effective and evenhanded way? In this spirit, the Article concludes by
suggesting that the antibalkanization principle could be applied to cases of concern to minority
communities that do not involve challenges to civil rights laws (for example, government use of
race in suspect apprehension).
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Whenever this issue of compensatory or preferential treatment for the Negro is
raised, some of our friends recoil in horror. The Negro should be granted
equality, they agree; but he should ask nothing more. On the surface, this
appears reasonable, but it is not realistic. For it is obvious that if a man is
entering the starting line in a race 300 years after another man, the first
would have to perform some impossible feat in order to catch up with his
fellow runner.
-Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (1964)'
We believe, like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in a colorblind, post-racial
society.
-Tea Party Petition to the NAACP (2010)2
The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often
it does.
-Justice Anthony M. Kennedy (2007)'
INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the Second Reconstruction, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
warned not only of the need to rectify centuries of discrimination but also of
the resentment among whites that claims for racial repair provoked. To
persuade white Americans of the justice of Negro claims, King invoked a
simple but effective sports metaphor: a race was not fair if one runner left the
starting line three hundred years before the other. The "starting line" story
vividly put in issue the structural discrimination that results from unequal
baselines and resources and so helped justify the Great Society and civil rights
1. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 147 (1964).
2. No Racism Petition, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://www.teapartypatriots.org/petition (last
visited Sept. 1, 2010) ("We believe ... that the NAACP should be embracing the individual
freedom and responsibility promoted by the [Tea Party Patriot] movement. It is nothing
less than 'hate speech' for the NAACP to be smearing us as 'racists' and 'bigots.' We believe,
like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.[,] in a colorblind, post-racial society. And we believe that
when an organization lies and resorts [to] the desperate tactics of racial division and hatred,
they should be publicly called on it.").
3. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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programs in the early decades of the Second Reconstruction.' But, as King
appreciated, these programs prompted many whites to "recoil in horror" and
provoked a backlash that has fatefully shaped our constitutional politics and
law. This Article explores the conflict as it plays out a half-century after King
spoke, in the Supreme Court's recent decisions addressing race-conscious
efforts to ensure integration in school districting and government
employment -Parents Involved' and Ricci.' Racial conflict has helped define the
composition of the Supreme Court and now is a matter not only of pragmatic
but also of principled concern in its civil rights decisions.
Important questions of law are at stake in how we describe divisions on the
Court in the race equality cases. Over the decades, observers of the Court have
come to describe the dispute in binary terms. The Justices who vote against
affirmative action and other race-conscious civil rights policies are said to
reason from a colorblind anticlassification principle, premised on the belief that
the Constitution protects individuals, not groups, and so bars all racial
classifications, except as a remedy for specific wrongdoing. The Justices who
vote to uphold affirmative action policies as constitutional are said to reason
from an antisubordination principle that identifies racial stratification (rather
than classification) as the wrong and endeavors to rectify the forms of group
inequality that race-based and race-salient policies have caused.
Describing disagreement in the race discrimination cases in this binary
framework obscures the views of the Justices who, over the years, have voted to
uphold and to limit affirmative action policies. This Article focuses on the views
of Justices in the middle of Supreme Court conflicts over race equality and
demonstrates that, in voting to uphold and to limit affirmative action policies,
they reason from an emergent independent view more concerned with social
cohesion than with colorblindness-a position that this Article analyzes as the
"antibalkanization" perspective. Abstracting from the complex logic of the case
4. See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: To
Fulfill These Rights (June 4, 1965), available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/
johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/65o6o4.asp ("You do not take a person who, for years,
has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and
then say, 'you are free to compete with all the others,' and still justly believe that you have
been completely fair... . This is the next and the more profound stage of the battle for civil
rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity[,] ... not just legal equity but human
ability, . . . not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a
result.").
5. 551 U.S. 701.
6. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
7. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470, 1470-78 (2004).
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law unfolding in history, I model division on the Court in a triadic framework
that recognizes three voting blocs in the equal protection cases concerning race
in the last several decades. I term "race conservatives" the Justices who strike
down civil rights initiatives on the ground that law should be colorblind, "race
progressives" the Justices who would allow (or require) government to remedy
practices that entrench historic inequalities among racial groups, and "race
moderates" the Justices who allow and limit civil rights initiatives in order to
preserve social cohesion. Attending to the forms of reasoning that
(i) differentiate race moderates from race conservatives and progressives and
(2) link the opinions of moderates preserving and limiting civil rights
initiatives, the Article asks whether we can read race moderates' opinions as
interpreting equal protection in light of a mediating principle concerned with
social cohesion, a concern analytically distinct from the value of individualism
associated with colorblindness and the concern to remedy group inequality
associated with antisubordination.
The first project of this Article, then, is to show the emergence and
development of the antibalkanization perspective in the opinions of race
moderates - and thus to demonstrate how a triadic framework better describes
historic divisions on the Court than a dyadic framework that depicts the swing
Justices as ambivalently tacking between the views of race conservatives and
race progressives. The Article's second project is to employ this triadic account
of divisions in the race cases to make sense of the shape and trajectory of the
Court's most recent cases. Attending to the antibalkanization values that led
Justice Kennedy to write separately from conservatives and progressives in
Parents Involved in turn illuminates these same concerns in the opinion Justice
Kennedy authored for five members of the Court in Ricci, and so identifies a
basis, grounded in the text of the decision and in several decades of
constitutional history, for reading Ricci as vindicating antibalkanization-
rather than colorblindness -values.
In analyzing the Court's past and current race cases, the Article's third aim
is to explore how the framework that we have long used to map conflicts over
colorblindness is evolving in new challenges to race-conscious, facially neutral
civil rights initiatives. Race conservatives first invoked colorblindness in cases
involving the constitutionality of "benign" racial classifications, where they
8. A mediating principle interprets a clause purposively to vindicate one particular
understanding of the concept or value the clause expressly guarantees, here the equal
protection of the laws. On the concept of mediating principles for the Equal Protection
Clause, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107
(1976); for one history of the conflict between anticlassification and antisubordination as
mediating principles for the Clause, see Siegel, supra note 7.
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insisted that the Constitution's injunction against classifying on the basis of
race vindicated values of individualism. But Justice Scalia is now encouraging
proponents of colorblindness to question the constitutionality of the disparate
impact provisions of federal employment discrimination law;' others question
the constitutionality of race-conscious but facially neutral practices that remedy
effects of past discrimination and promote integration, such as race-conscious
siting of school districts and admissions strategies that use facially neutral
criteria to increase student diversity.'o If race conservatives are beginning to
attack such race-conscious, facially neutral initiatives as unconstitutional, it is
not because the laws classify but because the laws violate colorblindness in
some other way. These new constitutional claims throw into question the
values colorblindness is serving (individual or group?) and diverge
dramatically from antibalkanzation's concern with social cohesion.
Antibalkanization understands that race-conscious, facially neutral
interventions may promote social cohesion by promoting equal opportunity, as
Justice Kennedy demonstrates in Parents Involved and Ricci when he discusses
permissible forms of race-conscious, facially neutral action by administrators
siting school districts and employers complying with the disparate impact
provisions of federal employment discrimination law. In distinguishing among
the colorblindness, antibalkanization, and antisubordination perspectives, the
Article demonstrates that there are several distinct yet overlapping frameworks
in which to analyze the constitutionality of race-conscious, facially neutral civil
rights initiatives. The Article's analysis of disparate impact's constitutionality
from this triadic perspective is especially timely as we mark the fortieth
anniversary of the Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," which
recognized disparate impact claims under federal employment discrimination
law.
As this Article uncovers the antibalkanization perspective in the Court's
cases, yet a fourth aim emerges: to undertake critical evaluation of the
antibalkanization perspective - both as the Justices have applied it, and as it
might be applied. Recognizing antibalkanization as a perspective distinct from
anticlassification and antisubordination makes possible debate about what it
9. See infra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
io. See, e.g., infra notes 15, 73 and accompanying text; cf Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787-88
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The plurality opinion is
too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal
opportunity regardless of their race. The plurality's postulate that '[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race' is not
sufficient to decide these cases." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
n. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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means to vindicate this commitment in a plausible and principled way and thus
allows even those who do not believe concerns about social cohesion are a
proper basis for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to enter into dialogue
with those who do.
Critical conversation of this kind would begin by clarifying the content of
the principle that is emergent in the Court's cases. Do antibalkanization
opinions only impose a side constraint on the pursuit of equality (that is,
government may pursue equality, however equality is understood, so long as
government acts in ways that do not unduly threaten social cohesion)? Or do
the antibalkanization opinions offer a substantive account of equality (that is,
government may act to ensure that no group is so deeply marginalized as to
feel an outsider or a nonparticipant, so long as government combats group
marginalization by means that do not unduly stimulate group resentment)?
Once clarified, we can evaluate the principle's application in particular cases.
Do the Court's cases vindicate antibalkanization values effectively and
evenhandedly? What new conversations might antibalkanization enable if we
were to apply the principle in new contexts, in cases that do not involve
challenges to civil rights initiatives but instead concern laws and practices that
are estranging to minority communities? The Article concludes by imagining a
revised equal protection framework in which the antibalkanization principle
constrains government consideration of race in the apprehension of criminal
suspects.
Part I of the Article derives the antibalkanization perspective from
constitutional history, from the opinions of race moderates on the Court who
have refused wholly to adopt an anticlassification or antisubordination
approach to the analysis of affirmative action but instead have enforced the
Equal Protection Clause with attention to the forms of social estrangement that
extremes of racial stratification and unconstrained racial remedies can
engender. As Part II of this Article shows, a tripartite framework attentive to
concerns of balkanization captures concerns moving the center of the Court
more faithfully than one focused solely on the conventional distinction
between anticlassification and antisubordination. justice Kennedy
demonstrated as much in his concurrence in Parents Involved, when he voted to
strike down an expressly race-based public school admissions policy intended
to preserve school integration because it used racial classifications he thought
likely to offend and polarize-while emphasizing that schools could pursue
integration by race-conscious but facially neutral means, such as the siting of
school attendance zones."
iz. See infra Part 11.
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Attending to the concerns about balkanization that Kennedy expressed in
his Parents Involved concurrence in turn suggests a principled basis for reading
Kennedy's majority opinion in Ricci, as Part III of this Article shows. In Ricci,
the Court held unlawful New Haven's decision to readminister a civil service
exam for fire department officers because the City was concerned that the
original examination identified a pool for promotion that included scarcely any
minority candidates. While the City justified its decision as avoiding a potential
violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits practices
with a racial disparate impact," Justice Kennedy held for a bitterly divided
court that New Haven's action instead violated Title VII's prohibition on racial
disparate treatment in a decision that rested on statutory grounds to avoid the
constitutional question -yet resonated with constitutional implications.14
Conservatives are rushing to read Ricci as suggesting that there might be
constitutional limits on disparate impact law emanating from colorblindness
values that would call into question the constitutionality of other facially
neutral laws that promote integration."s But if we read Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion in Ricci as responsive to concerns of balkanization rather than
colorblindness, we arrive at a very different understanding of the decision's
reach and scope. The action that Ricci holds unlawful may not be New Haven's
effort to identify a test for selecting employees without racial disparate impact
but instead the particular way in which the City pursued this aim: throwing
out a promotion test after administering it for publicly announced reasons
associated with the race of those who passed the exam." Not only does a
13. Federal employment discrimination law, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe (20o6)), prohibits
practices involving racial disparate treatment and, as codified by subsequent statutory
provisions, facially neutral practices that have a racial disparate impact not justified by
business necessity. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2.
14. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009). Ricci asserts, for the first time since the
Court first recognized the disparate impact cause of action under Title VII in its 1971 Griggs
decision, that there are potential conflicts between the disparate treatment and disparate
impact liability frameworks under Title VII. Id. at 2676. The decision further intimates that
some disparate impact challenges to facially neutral rules might raise questions of
constitutional magnitude. Id. ("Our statutory holding does not address the constitutionality
of the measures taken here in purported compliance with Title VII. We also do not hold that
meeting the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in
a future case."); see infra Part III.
is. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection, 20o8-
2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 73 (2009).
16. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664 ("When the examination results showed that white candidates
had outperformed minority candidates, the mayor and other local politicians opened a
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concern with racial balkanization identify a ground of liability distinct from the
City's effort to avoid promotion tests with unjustified racial disparate impact;
the same concern with balkanization provides an affirmative reason for the City
to avoid promotion tests with unjustified racial disparate impact. After all,
using a facially neutral promotion test that excludes virtually all minority
candidates to lead a fire department that has a history of race conflict" and
serves a majority-minority community 8 also has the potential to estrange and
balkanize, if the test is not plainly testing for skills needed to do the job.
Antibalkanization thus provides a principled basis for limiting Ricci to similar
cases of retesting and for preserving the disparate impact framework itself.
In a concluding Part IV, I raise questions about the antibalkanization
standpoint as it has thus far been vindicated in the Court's cases. Can we
understand antibalkanization as having its own substantive account of
equality? What explains antibalkanization's preoccupation with managing the
social form of government interventions in race relations? Does the
requirement that government structure its interventions in race relations so as
to minimize the salience of race necessarily work to preserve the racial status
quo? If not, under what conditions might it prove transformative? Is the
antibalkanization inquiry designed only for constraining civil rights initiatives,
or might the principle have more wide-ranging application, to forms of
government action of concern to minority communities? Might
antibalkanization help us imagine a different developmental trajectory for equal
protection law than proponents of colorblindness contemplate?
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE ANTIBALKANIZATION PRINCIPLE
Debate between the anticlassification and antisubordination
understandings of equal protection grew out of social struggle over Brown."
The debate emerged from two kinds of conflicts. In the decades after Brown,
civil rights lawyers challenged the constitutionality of facially neutral policies
with an assertedly unjustified racial disparate impact, while supporting the
constitutionality of "benign" race classifications in affirmative action policies;
they understood the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit policies that enforced
group subordination. Their critics, however, argued that under the Clause,
public debate that turned rancorous... . In the end the City took the side of those who
protested the test results. It threw out the examinations.").
17. See infra notes 175-183 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 173.
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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strict judicial oversight of government action should be reserved only for
policies that employed racial classifications (unless plaintiffs could prove
racially discriminatory purpose) and insisted that any use of racial
classifications, even to integrate, was unconstitutional. This "anticlassification"
position viewed the paradigmatic harm not as group subordination but rather
the classification of any individual by race. On the conventional account, the
anticlassification understanding of equal protection ultimately prevailed; in
fact, as I have elsewhere chronicled, neither understanding of our tradition has
ultimately proven powerful enough wholly to displace the other from our
law.2 o
Discussion of balkanization in our constitutional case law begins in the
opinions of the swing Justices who refused completely to align themselves with
an anticlassification or an antisubordination approach to equal protection and
voted instead to uphold, yet restrict, benign race-conscious policies. In what
follows, I briefly review this debate and focus on the distinctive set of concerns
about social cohesion the race moderates discussed as they endeavored to
bridge dispute on the Court and in the nation.
A. Mapping Equal Protection: The Anticlassification and Antisubordination
Principles
What does the Equal Protection Clause require of government in matters of
race discrimination? In constitutional law, this long-running debate has, since
the 1970s, been described as a debate between the anticlassification principle
and the antisubordination principle.
In this debate, proponents of the anticlassification principle associate the
rule against classifying by race with a value commonly associated with
colorblindness claims: protecting individuals from the harm of categorization
by race. As Justice Thomas has explained:
Brown I itself did not need to rely upon any psychological or social-
science research in order to announce the simple, yet fundamental,
truth that the government cannot discriminate among its citizens on
the basis of race. . . . At the heart of this interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause lies the principle that the government must treat
citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious
2o. I tell this story at greater length in a history of conflict over Brown, written on the half-
century anniversary of the decision. See Siegel, supra note 7.
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groups. It is for this reason that we must subject all racial classifications
to the strictest of scrutiny ....
Focused on the wrongs of classification, the anticlassification principle
tolerates practices that are facially neutral but have a disparate impact on
minorities; but it is intolerant of any use of racial classification, and hence it
views benign discrimination as just a fancy name for plain old discrimination.2 2
By contrast, the antisubordination principle is concerned with protecting
members of historically disadvantaged groups from the harms of unjust social
stratification. It is concerned with practices that disproportionately harm
21. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Individuals
who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under
our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That
concept is alien to the Constitution's focus upon the individual . . . . To pursue the concept
of racial entitlement -even for the most admirable and benign of purposes - is to reinforce
and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race
privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
American."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("[E]ven 'benign' racial quotas have individual victims, whose very
real injustice we ignore whenever we deny them enforcement of their right not to be
disadvantaged on the basis of race. . . . The relevant proposition is not that it was blacks, or
Jews, or Irish who were discriminated against, but that it was individual men and women,
'created equal,' who were discriminated against.").
The anticlassification principle, however, does not always vindicate individualism. It
does so only in a very specialized sense: by maintaining the irrelevance of formal racial
classifications. Many advocates of the anticlassification principle as applied to race do not
object to classification by other characteristics they consider "socially relevant." See Reva B.
Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and
Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 77 (2000) (analyzing the concept of
individualism in colorblindness discourse).
22. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 988 (2007) ("By reactionary colorblindness I mean an
anticlassification understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that accords race-conscious
remedies and racial subjugation the same level of constitutional hostility.").
23. For example, Owen Fiss called his version of the antisubordination principle the "group-
disadvantaging principle," and he defined it as the principle that laws may not "aggravate[] "
or "perpetuate[] . . . the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group." Fiss,
supra note 8, at io8, 157. Many others have urged that equal protection is best understood as
concerned with group subordination. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 162 (1987) (invoking the understanding that "[t]he
Court must review with great care laws that burden a racial minority"); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32-45 (1987)
(repudiating a model of equality focused on "difference" in favor of one that analyzes
"dominance"); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979) (arguing that courts should inquire "whether [a]
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members of marginalized groups and so condemns facially neutral practices
that have a racial disparate impact when such practices are not justified by a
weighty public purpose. Because the antisubordination principle focuses on
practices that disproportionally harm members of marginalized groups, it can
tell the difference between benign and invidious discrimination.
B. The Case Law: Two Principles and a Puzzle
This debate does not originate in Brown but in debates over what it means
to interpret the Equal Protection Clause in fidelity to Brown, decades later.' In
fact, early equal protection cases reflect both anticlassification and
antisubordination concerns. Brown does not discuss classifications but contains
language that resonates with both principles, declaring, for example: "To
separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
policy or practice . . . integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a
deprived position because of gender status"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-21, at 1514-21 (2d ed. 1988); id. § 16-21, at 1520 (advocating that
facially neutral state action be analyzed in accordance with an antisubjugation principle,
such that "strict judicial scrutiny would be reserved for those government acts that, given
their history, context, source, and effect, seem most likely not only to perpetuate
subordination but also to reflect a tradition of hostility toward an historically subjugated
group, or a pattern of blindness or indifference to the interests of that group"); Charles R.
Lawrence III, Two Rivers of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense ofAffirmative Action, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 928, 951 (2ool) (arguing for a consideration of "the constitutional and
moral command of equal protection" as requiring "ridding society of racial subordination"
rather than "mandating equal treatment as an individual right"); Athena D. Mutua, The
Rise, Development, and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84
DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336 (20o6) ("Critical Race Theory's . . . stance is one of
'antisubordination."').
For my own writing in this tradition, see Siegel, supra note 21; Siegel, supra note 7;
Reva B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v.
Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATWE ACTION 29 (Robert Post & Michael
Rogin eds., 1998) [hereinafter Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism]; and Reva B. Siegel, Why
Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997) [hereinafter Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects]. For
additional background, see Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How To Do
Equality, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 93 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009)
[hereinafter Balkin & Siegel, Remembering How To Do Equality]; and Jack M. Balkin & Reva
B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003) [hereinafter Balkin & Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition].
24. See Siegel, supra note 7.
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undone."2 In the 1960s, in cases like McLaughlin v. Florida 26 and Loving v.
Virginia,7 the Supreme Court adopted the general presumption that racial
classifications are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.28 But
Loving, like Brown, promiscuously employed both antisubordination and
anticlassification discourses: the decision explained the racial wrong of
Virginia's antimiscegenation law using the presumption that racial
classifications are unconstitutional, and it condemned Virginia's law using the
language of "White Supremacy." 2  (In the 196os, at the time the Court
adopted the strict scrutiny framework in its Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection cases, it was a common understanding that school districts could
take race into account for purpose of achieving school integration;3o this use of
25. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). For a recent analysis of the theories
underlying the Brown decision at the time it was argued, see Christopher W. Schmidt,
Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (2008). Schmidt shows that
while the NAACP lawyers who argued Brown did use the language of colorblindness, they
believed that segregation inflicted the harm of subordination as well as classification, and
they believed that color-conscious remedies were necessary for racial repair.
26. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
27. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. Id. at 10-11.
29. Id. at 11 ("There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial
discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only
interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications
must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy."). See Siegel, supra note 7, at 1503-05 (locating the Court's opinion in Loving
within the legacy of Brown and on the anticlassification-antisubordination spectrum).
30. For discussion of the 1960s cases, see Siegel, supra note 7, at 1515-17 & n.162. Supreme Court
Justices in the 1970s acknowledged this understanding. See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) ("School authorities are traditionally
charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well
conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion
for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation,
however, that would not be within the authority of a federal court.").
Ensuing cases display this common understanding. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent.
Sch. Dist., 212 F. 3d 738, 751 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[L]ocal school authorities have the power to
voluntarily remedy de facto segregation existing in schools and, indeed, such integration
serves important societal functions."); id. at 752 ("The absence of a duty [to desegregate]
sheds little light on the constitutionality of a voluntary attempt."); Jacobson v. Cincinnati
Bd. of Educ., 961 F.2d loo, 102 (6th Cir. 1992) ("This authority [afforded to local school
officials] includes the power to prescribe a ratio of white to minority students that reflects
the composition of the overall school district, particularly when such a policy is
implemented in order to prepare students for life in a pluralistic society.").
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race was not considered a "racial classification" within the meaning of the
framework.")
It was in the 1970s that the Court decided the cases that seemed to split
apart concerns with anticlassification and antisubordination. During the 1970s,
in cases such as Keyes v. School District No. 1,1' Washington v. Davis," and
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney," the Court decided that facially neutral
practices with a disparate racial impact did not violate the Constitution unless
such practices were adopted with discriminatory purpose. Increasingly, the
Court conflated Brown's holding with the presumption against racial
classifications and treated government use of racial classifications as a necessary
condition for heightened judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause;
government actions not containing racial classifications thus did not provoke
the presumption of unconstitutionality, even if such facially neutral policies
tended to bear more harshly on one group than another. During this same
period, the Court began to insist that the presumption against racial
31. See Norman Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race,
67 MICH. L. REV. 1553, 1616-17 (1969) (analyzing different forms of race-conscious state
action). For a more sustained discussion of Vieira's argument, see Siegel, supra note 7, at
1529 n.205.
32- 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973) ("[P]laintiffs must prove not only that segregated schooling exists
but also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional state action.").
33. 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (explaining "the basic equal protection principle that the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose").
34. 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect
upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that
impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose."); see also id. at 271-72 ("The equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the States all power
of classification. Most laws classify, and many affect certain groups unevenly, even though
the law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the class described by the
law. When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven effects upon particular groups
within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern."(citations omitted)).
35. See id. at 272 ("Certain classifications ... in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy.
Race is the paradigm. A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is
presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." (citing
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)));
see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) ("This presumption of constitutional
validity . . . disappears if a statutory classification is predicated on criteria that are, in a
constitutional sense, 'suspect,' the principal example of which is a classification based on
race." (citing Brown, 347 U.S. 483)); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) ("Not all
legislation . . . is entitled to the same presumption of validity. The presumption is not
present when a State has enacted legislation whose purpose or effect is to create classes
based upon racial criteria, since racial classifications, in a constitutional sense, are inherently
'suspect."' (citing McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 184; Brown, 347 U.S. 483)).
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classifications impugned the constitutional validity of benign, race-conscious
efforts to integrate. In a series of cases ranging from Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke 6 and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC 7 to City ofRichmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.,8 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,9 the Court became ever
more clear that it would apply strict scrutiny to affirmative action in a variety of
settings. Only with these debates concerning the application of the Equal
Protection Clause to "facially neutral" school assignment policies and "benign"
race-based admissions policies do anticlassification and antisubordination
assume shape as competing principles with concrete stakes that seem to settle
practical questions of law: it is at that point that the emphasis on classification
as an element of the harm is taken to answer decisively questions about the
constitutional status of particular practices under Brown.
Yet, there are important features of our law that the anticlassification
principle cannot explain. Most strikingly, strict scrutiny is no longer "fatal in
fact" but allows government to consider race, in terms implicitly sensitive to
majority and minority status.4 o While Justice Powell supplied the crucial fifth
vote in Bakke to reject an antisubordination (or "two-class""1 ) reading of the
Equal Protection Clause, he allowed consideration of race in admissions for
purposes of promoting student "diversity," if admissions were administered
through a process that gave individualized consideration to each applicant and
considered race as one of multiple diversity criteria42 - a framework that a five-
36. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
37. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
38. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
39. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
40. See id. at 237 ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal
in fact.' The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and
government is not disqualified from acting in response to it." (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980))). In Adarand, Justice O'Connor insisted that her view
of consistency did not "'equate[] remedial preferences with invidious discrimination' or
"ignore[] the difference between 'an engine of oppression' and an effort 'to foster equality in
society,' or, more colorfully, 'between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat."' Id. at
229 (quoting id. at 246, id. at 243, id. at 243, id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
41. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("'The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed
solely against discrimination due to a "two-class theory"-that is, based upon differences
between "white" and Negro."' (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, 478 (1954))).
42. Id. at 315, 318; see also Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REv.
1745, 1751 (1996) (discussing Powell's view that "a university could not use a strict quota or a
rigid set-aside in an attempt to enhance diversity" but "must look instead to the whole
person"); Siegel, supra note 7, at 1538 (discussing "the rationale of Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion . . . that public universities could promote the diversity of their student bodies by
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Justice majority of the Court adopted in GrutterA3 and that Justice O'Connor
there explained in terms even more wide-ranging than Justice Powell's."
A similarly asymmetric understanding of race may guide discriminatory
purpose doctrine as well. Even as the Rehnquist Court continued to restrict
affirmative action programs employing racial classifications through the 198os
and 1990s, the Court tolerated and even encouraged race-conscious
interventions of a different form by imposing a "narrow-tailoring requirement"
that asked the government to show it had exhausted facially neutral means of
promoting minority participation before it employed racial classifications to
achieve the same end.4 ' The narrow-tailoring constraint on affirmative action
created incentives to develop facially neutral programs designed to increase
minority participation, such as ten-percent plans.46  If these plans are
constitutional, they too seem to require differentiating between benign and
invidious purpose in government consideration of race.
C. Race Moderates and Concerns ofBalkanization
While race conservatives emphasizing themes of colorblindness have
succeeded in applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action, they have done so
with the help of "swing" Justices who voted to preserve these policies but
sharply limit their scope. For example, in Bakke, four members of the Court
opposed an admissions policy that took applicant race into account in order to
considering race as one factor in the admissions process, so long as the admissions officers
continued to evaluate every applicant as an individual").
43. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 3o6, 341 (2003) (citing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and
endorsing the proposition that diversity is a compelling interest sufficient to justify race-
conscious admissions processes "so long as a race-conscious admissions program uses race
as a 'plus' factor in the context of individualized consideration").
44. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (holding that a
city's race-conscious action was not narrowly tailored in part because "there [did] not
appear to have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority
... participation" and approving the use of race-neutral policies to facilitate racial equality);
id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("Racial preferences appear to 'even the score'
(in some small degree) only if one embraces the proposition that our society is appropriately
viewed as divided into races, making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a black
man should be compensated for by discriminating against a white. Nothing is worth that
embrace. Since blacks have been disproportionately disadvantaged by racial discrimination,
any race-neutral remedial program aimed at the disadvantaged as such will have a
disproportionately beneficial impact on blacks. Only such a program, and not one that
operates on the basis of race, is in accord with the letter and the spirit of our Constitution.").
46. See infra notes loo, 104 and accompanying text.
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increase minority representation in a state medical school;4 7 but with Justice
Powell casting the deciding vote, the Court sanctioned affirmative action in
education, so long as it assumed a particular form. Justice Powell rejected
affirmative action to rectify societal discrimination as resting on what he
termed a problematic "two-class theory" of equal protection that he feared
would stimulate racial resentment because many of those "dispreferred" had
their own histories of disadvantage." He warned: "Disparate constitutional
tolerance of such classifications well may serve to exacerbate racial and ethnic
antagonisms rather than alleviate them."4 Yet Justice Powell then proceeded to
assert that consideration of race in admissions to increase "diversity" was
permissible so long as race was not the sole criterion of diversity and all
applicants received individualized consideration.s0 While not a majority
opinion for the Court, the Powell diversity framework has been widely
adopted, and, with Justice O'Connor's vote, was ratified by a majority of a
bitterly divided Court in Grutter."
In the Bakke era, Justice Brennan and other race liberals on the Court began
to discuss the potential risks of race-conscious interventions- including "the
social reality that even a benign policy assignment by race is viewed as unjust
47. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271-72.
48. See, e.g., id. at 295 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("The concepts of 'majority' and 'minority'
necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments. As observed above, the
white 'majority' itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim
to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.").
49. Id. at 298-99. Justice Powell states:
All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on the basis
of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals burdened.
The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities may outrage
those so deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious. These individuals
are likely to find little comfort in the notion that the deprivation they are asked to
endure is merely the price of membership in the dominant majority and that its
imposition is inspired by the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others. One
should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and the perception of
mistreatment that accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and privileges on
the basis of skin color and ethnic origin.
Id. at 294 n-34.
5o. Id. at 318; see also Amar & Katyal, supra note 42, at 1751 (discussing Powell's view that "a
university could not use a strict quota or a rigid set-aside in an attempt to enhance diversity"
but "must look instead to the whole person").
51. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (citing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and
endorsing the proposition that diversity is a compelling interest sufficient to justify race-
conscious admissions processes "so long as a race-conscious admissions program uses race
as a 'plus' factor in the context of individualized consideration").
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by many in our society, especially by those individuals who are adversely
affected by a given classification."s2 But in Bakke the liberal wing of the Court
voted to reserve strict scrutiny for race-based state action that burdened and
stigmatized minorities and to apply intermediate scrutiny to race-based
remedies that burdened whites, a framework in which courts would oversee,
with a presumption of deference, government efforts to promote racial
integration."
It was Justice O'Connor who followed Justice Powell in extending strict
scrutiny to affirmative action and threatening to invalidate race-based efforts to
integrate unless the effort assumed judicially sanctioned form. Like Justice
Powell, Justice O'Connor applied strict scrutiny emphasizing the risks of
"racial hostility" that racial remedies posed." In Shaw v. Reno," Justice
O'Connor asserted that race-conscious remedies threatened to "balkanize us
into competing racial factions":
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our
society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our
history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin.
Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.
Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us
into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the
goal of a political system in which race no longer matters - a goal that
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the
52. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 174 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part)
(upholding against constitutional challenge a redistricting plan under the Voting Rights
Act); id. at 172-76 (discussing potential harms of race-based remedial interventions). I am
indebted to Rick Pildes for drawing my attention to Justice Brennan's opinion in United
Jewish Organizations,
53. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality opinion)
("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead
to a politics of racial hostility. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 298
(opinion of Powell, J.) ('[P] referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes
holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based
on a factor having no relation to individual worth')." (alteration in original)).
55. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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Nation continues to aspire. It is for these reasons that race-based
districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.6
Since Paul Mishkin elucidated the complex character of Justice Powell's
reasoning in Bakke," there has been growing attention to the ways in which the
Court's cases constraining the so-called benign uses of race are concerned
about the risk of racial resentment that policies of racial rectification engender.
Racial balkanization is a theme in the voting rights literature.s Most recently,
56. Id. at 657; see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.)
(arguing that excessively gerrymandered districts "cause constitutional harm insofar as they
convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial").
57. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality ofAffirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 927-28 (1983) ("Even when the
net operative results may be the same, the use of euphemisms may serve valuable purposes;
as do legal fictions, they may facilitate the acceptance of needed measures." (footnote
omitted)). Mishkin argues:
Indirectness may also have significant advantages in muting public reactions
to, and possible resentment of, the granting of preference on racial lines. The use
of overt numbers, whether stated as literal quotas or as "set-asides" for qualified
applicants, greatly tends to trigger the symbolism of the infamous "numerus
clausus" and other exclusionary devices of past invidious religious, ethnic, and
racial discrimination. The incorporation of such features in an institutional
admissions program continuing indefinitely from year to year, tends continually
to keep alive consciousness of the program and the relevance of race therein; it
tends to maintain and exacerbate latent and overt hostility to these effects to
overcome the efforts of past racial discrimination. A program formulated along
the lines Justice Powell's opinion approves would, by the very lack of "sharp
edges," avoid such visibility in its operations and tend to enhance the acceptability
of the program.
Id. at 928; see also Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the LawPolitics Distinction:
Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALF. L.
REV. 1473, 1493-97 (2007).
58. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 634-39 (1993); Samuel
Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
205, 224-25, 238-39; Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American
Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83; Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on
Racial and Partisan Redistricting, io6 YALE L.J. 2505, 2537 (1997) ("[G]enuine 'expressive
harms' might legitimately be thought to arise from the highly visible political manipulation
of electoral structures, particularly when done selectively for racial purposes."); Richard H.
Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 483, 503 (1993)
("Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw ... permits noninvidious uses of race, as long as
policymakers do not allow race to become -or appear to be-paramount to all other relevant
values."); see also id. at 526 ("Government cannot redistrict in a way that conveys the social
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Sam Issacharoff, Robert Post, and Neil Siegel have discussed concerns about
racial balkanization underlying the requirement of individualized consideration
in the Court's affirmative action cases." The concept of balkanization seems
sufficiently grounded in the cases and commentary that it can serve as a
framework for exploring the trajectory of equal protection law more generally.
In what follows, I adopt the term "balkanization" from the voting rights
and affirmative action cases and commentary, where it is employed to discuss
the rationale for restrictions imposed on benign race-conscious state action and
situate it in the anticlassification/antisubordination debate. If we examine
concerns articulated by the Justices who have voted to allow yet restrict
affirmative action, it is immediately apparent that the votes and views of race
moderates do not conform to the anticlassification or the antisubordination
position. Of course, race moderates might simply be ambivalent in their
impression that race consciousness has overridden all other, traditionally relevant
redistricting values.").
59. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2oo2 Term -Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and the Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4, 74 (2003) ("'In such circumstances, the
fear of racial "balkanization" is most pronounced."' (quoting Samuel Issacharoff, Can
Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 691 (1998))); Post & Siegel, supra note
57, at 1494-95 ("Mishkin's scrutiny of this issue is nothing short of brilliant.... It elucidates
why in dealing with questions involving the intersection of race and electoral design the
Court has explicitly concluded that 'appearances do matter.' It anticipates the work of a later
generation of scholars who interpret the Court's equal protection decisions as driven by the
necessity of shaping interventions to an expressive form that will allay 'the fear of racial
"balkanization"' while simultaneously sustaining the constitutionality of legislative redress
for the present effects of past discrimination." (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647; Issacharoff,
supra, at 691)); Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization,
Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DuKE L.J. 781, 787 (20o6) ("My scrutiny of
the case law suggests that the type of individualized consideration required in a given
context turns on the Court's judgment about how the use of racial criteria is likely to impact
racial balkanization in America over the long run."); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics,
114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1294 (2005) ("Our country is more ethnically, religiously, and
ideologically heterogeneous now than at any previous time in its history -and that diversity
is a source of potential instability. The possibility of exit and collapse is not, however, the
only or even the most important challenge. A pluralist democracy needs emerging groups to
commit to its processes just as much as it needs established groups to stick to those
processes."); Siegel, supra note 7, at 1530-32; id. at 1532 ("In quiet ways, Justice Powell
understood that members of superordinate and subordinate groups were differently
situated, and in constitutionally significant ways. Even as he rejected a race-asymmetric or
antisubordination framework for interpreting the presumption against racial classifications,
Justice Powell offered the nation a master compromise in the concept of 'diversity' itself- a
framework that would allow limited voluntary race-conscious efforts at desegregation to
continue, in a social form that would preserve the Constitution as a domain of neutral
principles.").
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commitments and lack distinct views of their own. But before concluding as
much, this Article explores the possibility that there might be an analytically
distinct set of concerns shaping their decisions -concerns obscured so long as
we continue to model division on the Court in the
anticlassification/antisubordination framework. If we examine the concerns
expressed by Justices Powell and O'Connor as they voted to allow affirmative
action and to constrain it under a strict scrutiny framework, we can appreciate
that they have not called for a wholly colorblind jurisprudence, appearances to
the contrary notwithstanding. 60
As we have seen, both Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor cite the
resentment of the "dispreferred" as a reason to impose restrictions on race-
conscious remedies. Yet, unlike strict proponents of a colorblind
anticlassification principle who would limit race-conscious remedies to
repairing past identified, intentional discrimination, Justices Powell and
O'Connor permit race-conscious government action for other purposes, so
long as it is subject to judicial restraint.i Why? The diversity rationale for
allowing affirmative action that Justice Powell proposed and Justice O'Connor
embraced is specifically concerned with promoting social cohesion. As Justice
Powell expressed it, "[lit is not too much to say that the 'nation's future
6o. Justice O'Connor called for doctrinal "consistency" in the treatment of minority and
majority discrimination claims in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 5i U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
Yet in response to Justice Stevens's objection that "[t]he consistency that the Court espouses
would disregard the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat," id. at
245 (Stevens, J., dissenting), Justice O'Connor insisted that her view of consistency did not
"'equate[] remedial preferences with invidious discrimination"' or "ignore[] the difference
between 'an engine of oppression' and an effort 'to foster equality in society,' or, more
colorfully, 'between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat,"' id. at 229 (majority
opinion) (quoting id. at 246, id. at 243, id. at 243, id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). For
Justice Kennedy's account of the limits of the colorblindness approach, see infra notes 83-85
and accompanying text.
61. Although Justice O'Connor's and Justice Powell's opinions in Bakke, Croson, and Adarand
are often remembered for imposing strict scrutiny and other restrictions on the use of
benign racial classifications, these opinions also endorsed the constitutionality of some
forms of affirmative action for reasons other than correcting the wrong of past intentional
discrimination. In Croson, for instance, Justice O'Connor wrote that, in certain cases, "some
form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns of
deliberate exclusion" and that a state or local government may adopt such preferences,
subject to judicial supervision to ensure they are "taken in the service of the goal of equality
itself." City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509, 510 (1989). While Justice
O'Connor would allow government to pursue "equality itself," Justice Scalia reasoned in
much narrower, corrective justice terms, insisting that "there is only one circumstance in
which the States may act by race to 'undo the effects of past discrimination': where that is
necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification."
Id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of
students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples."" In Grutter, Justice
O'Connor announced:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the
openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this
training. As we have recognized, law schools "cannot be effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law
interacts."
On closer examination, the reason that Justice O'Connor has given for
recognizing that government has a compelling purpose in promoting diversity
in education is related to her reason for restricting affirmative action. In both
contexts, Justice O'Connor interprets equal protection so as to promote social
cohesion and to avoid racial arrangements that balkanize and threaten social
cohesion. Concern with balkanization thus supplies affirmative reason to allow
affirmative action and to limit it-to allow certain race-conscious efforts to
integrate institutions so as to assure members of underrepresented groups that
they have an opportunity to participate, while doing so in ways designed to
reassure majority groups that their participation is not thereby unjustly
constrained.64
I term this third vantage point on the Equal Protection Clause the
antibalkanization perspective. In what follows, I identify the understandings
that seem to guide the antibalkanization perspective, relating and
differentiating antibalkanization from the anticlassification and
antisubordination principles from which it emerged in dialogue.
62. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
63. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 3o6, 332 (2003) (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634
(1950)). In Bakke, Justice Powell's justification for diversity focused on the First
Amendment and educational concerns, 438 U.S. at 312-14; by contrast, Justice O'Connor's
restatement in Grutter focused on concerns of social cohesion more generally.
64. See Siegel, supra note 7, at 1532.
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D. The Antibalkanization Perspective
In prohibiting race-based civil rights initiatives, race conservatives are
conventionally understood as reasoning from the anticlassification principle
concerned with threats to individualism, 65 while race progressives who uphold
affirmative action and other race-conscious civil rights initiatives are
understood to reason about equality with attention to subordination or group
status. As this analysis has shown, the Justices at the center of the Court who
have cast the deciding votes to uphold and limit race-conscious civil rights
initiatives often explain their position in opinions concerned with threats to
social cohesion. Justices reasoning from this antibalkanization perspective
enforce the Equal Protection Clause with attention to the forms of
estrangement that both racial stratification and practices of racial remediation
may engender.
Because Justices reasoning from an antibalkanization perspective
understand that pervasive racial stratification can engender anomie and leave
some groups feeling like outsiders or nonparticipants, the Justices permit and
sometimes encourage government to act in ways that promote racial
integration (a form of equality realized through social cohesion). Because
Justices reasoning from an antibalkanization perspective understand that
interventions promoting racial integration can become a locus of racial conflict,
they insist that race-conscious interventions undertaken for compelling public-
regarding purposes must nonetheless anticipate and endeavor to ameliorate
race-conscious resentments. Race-conscious resentments among the racially
privileged matter because, if ignored, they may inhibit the amelioration of
racial stratification and because these resentments may reflect displaced
expressions of other forms of inequality.
Antibalkanization takes from the antisubordination principle an attention
to historical and social context. Reasoning from history and social structure,
the antibalkanization perspective does not view all government use of race as
the same and cannot be reduced to colorblindness. Antibalkanization
recognizes that the nation has a history of racial wrongs that it seeks to
transcend -a history that has shaped endowments and baselines in ways that
confound efforts to attain race neutrality. Reasoning from history, Justices
employing the antibalkanization perspective are capable of differentiating
65. See supra text accompanying note 21. But cf Siegel, supra note 21, at 92-93 (analyzing the
concept of individualism in colorblindness discourse).
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between government policies that entrench and repair race inequality. 66 Like
antisubordination, the antibalkanization perspective thinks about equal
protection purposively and structurally: it assesses the constitutionality of
government action by asking about the kind of polity it creates. The opinions
preserving and limiting race-conscious remedies have emphasized the
importance of cultivating social bonds that enable groups to relate and identify
across difference if citizens are to feel that they live in an equal opportunity
6,
society.
Yet this same attention to social structure and social meaning leads
proponents of antibalkanization to break with proponents of antisubordination
over the use of race-conscious remedies. Proponents of antibalkanization are
concerned that the pursuit of racial justice itself poses threats to community
and are prepared to subordinate the pursuit of racial justice to the preservation
of social cohesion. Antibalkanization takes from the anticlassification principle
attention to the claims of those aggrieved by benign race-conscious
interventions. It attends to the concerns of the dispreferred, channeling their
concerns into limits on race-conscious remedies, which it often justifies in the
name of individualism. In the interests of avoiding conflict and
66. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' The unhappy persistence of
both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in
this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it." (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980))). In Adarand,
Justice O'Connor insisted that her view of consistency did not "'equate[] remedial
preferences with invidious discrimination"' or "ignore[] the difference between 'an engine
of oppression' and an effort 'to foster equality in society,' or, more colorfully, 'between a
"No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat."' Id. at 229 (quoting id. at 246, 243, 243, 245
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
67. Consider the justifications that Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor offered for recognizing
the pursuit of diversity as a compelling purpose that can justify government consideration of
race under the Equal Protection Clause. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. For a
critical analysis of the role that multicultural education might play in promoting integration
(where integration is understood as a polity in which members have a sense of belonging
and identify with the polity's major institutions and practices and feel at home in them), see
ANDREW MASON, COMMUNITY, SOLIDARITY AND BELONGING 148-70 (2000). Identification
across difference plays an important role in enabling a commitment to equality. Cf Dov Fox,
Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian Ethos, 33 AM. J.L. &
MED. 567, 587 (2007) ("[U]nless people share an underlying moral bond sufficiently strong
to shore up an ethos of sharing, public institutions will be without compelling moral reason
for the less advantaged to make claims on the social and economic resources of the more
advantaged.").
68. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (observing that in a narrowly tailored plan, "[a]s Justice Powell
made clear in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a
flexible, nonmechanical way" and "universities cannot establish quotas for members of
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estrangement, the antibalkanization perspective privileges race-conscious
interventions that interact with the public in forms that affirm commonality
rather than difference.6 9 This concern with the form and "appearance"o7 of
lawmaking is pragmatic, purposive, and contextual -providing socially
situated rather than formalist reasons for employing the authority of
colorblindness discourse. Proponents of antibalkanization recognize that, to get
beyond race, it may be necessary to take race into account; but, for them,
taking race into account means crafting interventions that ameliorate racial
wrongs without unduly aggravating racial resentments. The goal of promoting
social cohesion may provide a motivation to intervene in race relations, as well
as to require limitations on racial interventions; the antibalkanization
perspective, by its very terms, requires attention to social context and social
meaning.
The antibalkanization perspective understands the repair of racial injustice
as fundamentally political, a responsibility of representative institutions of
government as well as courts. Unlike the anticlassification and
antisubordination principles, which were articulated as courts were striking
down openly segregative laws, the antibalkanization principle emerged later, as
courts grappled with challenges to the constitutionality of civil rights laws.
Where the anticlassification and antisubordination principles have been
articulated in ways that presuppose that the judiciary is the branch of
government primarily responsible for vindicating equality values, the
antibalkanization perspective emerged in answer to the question of whether
courts would allow representative government to rectify race inequality. In the
cases that we have examined, questions of constitutional permission
predominate (that is, government is permitted but not required to promote
integration; government may engage in affirmative action for certain purposes
but not others). Antibalkanization vindicates constitutional values by
certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admissions tracks"); id. at
341 ("To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must not 'unduly
burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups."' (quoting
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting))).
69. Consider, for instance, Justice Powell's insistence that all seats must be open to competition
and his requirement of individualized consideration. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18 (1978).
70. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) ("[W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in
which appearances do matter."). Race progressives have criticized race moderates' attention
to appearance as lacking forthrightness. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 305 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately
described, fully disclosed College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving
similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises.").
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authorizing representative institutions to promote equality, while imposing on
courts responsibility for constraining the form of political interventions so as to
ameliorate resentments they may engender. Antibalkanization thus
understands the judicial role not as mandating or managing, but as channeling
constitutional politics that vindicate equality values." Discharging this
responsibility entangles proponents of antibalkanization in the necessarily
messy project of line-drawing. These concerns distinguish Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Parents Involved.
II. PARENTS INVOLVED AND ANTIBALKANIZATION
Revisiting debates over the core principle of equal protection helps make
sense of the divisions among the Justices in Parents Involved. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas write on the anticlassification understanding of
Brown. Justices Breyer and Stevens write on the antisubordination
understanding of Brown. Justice Kennedy stakes out a position in the tradition
of Justices Powell and O'Connor that is responsive to the tug of each vision,
while refusing cleanly to adopt either.
In Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts writes for a five-Justice majority
to emphasize that the Court's past cases had recognized the Constitution as
permitting government consideration of race only for two compelling
purposes: remedying "the effects of past intentional discrimination" and
promoting diversity in education, under Grutter, as "part of a broader
assessment of diversity, and not simply an effort to achieve racial balance.""
Then, in a plurality opinion that Justice Kennedy does not join, Chief Justice
Roberts proceeds to impugn any nonremedial consideration of race that does
not meet Grutter's requirements for diversity, attacking in particular
government consideration of race to promote integration without a predicate
finding of constitutional violation, an aim he pejoratively condemns as "racial
balancing."" Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges that it was once a
71. Cf Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 430 (2007) (observing "how judges can use flexible
constitutional standards to channel and mediate conflict, guiding public dialogue about
hotly controverted social practices and endeavoring to shape the social meaning of
competing claims"). For discussion of antibalkanization and the judicial role, see infa
Part IV.
72. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720, 723 (2007).
73. Id. at 725-33 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Roberts explains:
Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the
imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our
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commonplace understanding that school boards were permitted to consider
race in order to reduce de facto segregation even if they were not
constitutionally required to do so-an understanding the Court expressed in
Swann.74 But Chief Justice Roberts dismisses Chief Justice Burger's language in
Swann as mere dicta, which in any event, he argues, had no bearing on the use
of racial classifications of the kind at issue in the instant case, which involved
individualized admissions policies." Chief Justice Roberts famously concludes
his opinion in Parents Involved by invoking the colorblindness reading of
Brown76 : "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race."77 Justice Thomas is even more emphatic:
"Disfavoring a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution, the dissent would
give school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis of race - an
approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in Brown v.
Board of Education .. . . This approach is just as wrong today as it was a half
century ago." 7
repeated recognition that "[a]t the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as
individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class."
The principle that racial balancing is not permitted is one of substance, not
semantics. Racial balancing is not transformed from "patently unconstitutional"
to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it "racial diversity." While the
school districts use various verbal formulations to describe the interest they seek
to promote- racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration -they
offer no definition of the interest that suggests it differs from racial balance.
Id. at 730-32 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.s. 900, 911 (1995))-
74. Id. at 721 n.1o (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
75. Id. ("The districts point to dicta in a prior opinion [Swann] in which the Court suggested
that, while not constitutionally mandated, it would be constitutionally permissible for a
school district to seek racially balanced schools as a matter of 'educational policy."'); id. at
738 ("Swann addresses only a possible state objective; it says nothing of the permissible
means-race-conscious or otherwise-that a school district might employ to achieve that
objective."). For case law reflecting the common understanding that government is
permitted to consider race in the design of school attendance zones to promote integration,
see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 747-48 ("For schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that
have removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way 'to achieve
a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis' is to stop
assigning students on a racial basis." (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349
U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955))).
77. Id. at 748.
78. Id. (citation omitted) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 778 ("What was wrong in 1954
cannot be right today."). For an account of the theories underlying Brown, see Schmidt,
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The four dissenting Justices in Parents Involved express key tenets of the
antisubordination understanding of Brown. Justice Stevens attacks the
formalism of the colorblindness creed, invoking antisubordination's race-
conscious concern with group inequality and emphasizing that the
constitutionality of governmental uses of race depends on whether they
perpetuate or alleviate segregation: "I have long adhered to the view that a
decision to exclude a member of a minority because of his race is
fundamentally different from a decision to include a member of a minority for
that reason."" Justice Breyer grounds his lengthy dissent in some fifty years of
race-conscious efforts to bring about integration that the Supreme Court had
"repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local authorities to
undertake," pointing to that history to demonstrate that "the Constitution
permits local communities to adopt desegregation plans even where it does not
require them to do so."o
In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy casts the deciding vote to strike down
the use of race classifications in admissions policies, authoring an opinion that
stakes out a position between the anticlassification and antisubordination
visions of Brown. Justice Kennedy agrees with Chief Justice Roberts's plurality
opinion that government policies employing racial classifications for benign
purposes are subject to strict scrutiny"' and that the schools' use of racial
classifications in the instant case is not narrowly tailored."' But he then
proceeds to emphasize his differences with the Chief Justice, attending both to
questions of ends and of means.
Justice Kennedy insists that colorblindness cannot be construed as a rule
that inhibits government from acting to promote its legitimate interest in the
racial integration of schools. In a crucial passage of his opinion, Justice
Kennedy explains:
[P]arts of the opinion by [Chief Justice Roberts] imply an all-too-
unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in
my view, it may be taken into account. The plurality opinion is too
dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people
have equal opportunity regardless of their race. The plurality's postulate
supra note 25, and for an account of their subsequent renegotiation, see Martha Minow, After
Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIs & CLARK L. REV. 599 (2oo8); and
Siegel, supra note 7.
79. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 799 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8o. Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
s. Id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
82. Id. at 787.
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that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race" is not sufficient to decide these
cases.8
Justice Kennedy is clear why government has a legitimate interest "in ensuring
all people have an equal opportunity regardless of their race." "The enduring
hope is that race should not matter," Justice Kennedy emphasizes, but "the
reality is that too often it does."" Race matters, Justice Kennedy explains,
because of the long history of government-sanctioned racial inequality:
The statement by Justice Harlan that "[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind" was most certainly justified in the context of his dissent in
[Plessy]. The Court's decision in that case was a grievous error it took
far too long to overrule. . . . [A]s an aspiration, Justice Harlan's axiom
must command our assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it
cannot be a universal constitutional principle.s
In order to ensure that citizens have equal opportunity regardless of race,
Justice Kennedy emphasizes in Parents Involved that government may employ
race-conscious but facially neutral policies designed to integrate: "[S]trategic
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and
tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race." 6 A district
that selects a site of a new school or draws its attendance zones with "general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods" may make decisions in
which race is a but-for cause of the allocation of resources and opportunities,
yet Justice Kennedy emphasizes that such decisions do not ordinarily warrant
close judicial oversight. As he explains it: "These mechanisms are race-
conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that
tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them
would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.""' He goes on to
observe:
83. Id. at 787-88 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 787.
85. Id. at 788 (first alteration in original) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)).
86. Id. at 789; see also id. at 788 ("In the administration of public schools by the state and local
authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt general
policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial composition.").
87. Id. at 789.
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Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have
considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted
to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional
violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the
impact a given approach might have on students of different races.
Assigning to each student a personal designation according to a crude
system of individual racial classifications is quite a different matter; and
the legal analysis changes accordingly."
Why does Justice Kennedy join four Justices in declaring unconstitutional
the government's use of racial classifications to promote diversity in
admissions but then distance himself in order to affirm government efforts to
pursue the same ends by facially neutral means? In these passages, Justice
Kennedy seems to distinguish between government's race-conscious ends and
its race-conscious means. Kennedy goes out of his way to emphasize that the
government need not ignore race but that, if government does intervene in race
relations, it must proceed with care. Kennedy warns that the practice of
classifying individuals by race implicates concerns of human dignity and
consequently threatens social divisiveness. Because government interventions
can encourage more constructive or corrosive kinds of political interchange, the
form of race-conscious interventions matter:
When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first
define what it means to be of a race. Who exactly is white and who is
nonwhite? To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is
inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society. And it is a
label that an individual is powerless to change. Governmental
classifications that command people to march in different directions
based on racial typologies can cause a new divisiveness. The practice
can lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of
our diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political
process. On the other hand race-conscious measures that do not rely on
differential treatment based on individual classifications present these
problems to a lesser degree."
as. Id.
8g. Id. at 797. Dignity is a key constitutional value for Justice Kennedy and is of wide-ranging
significance in his opinions. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1736-45 (2008) (demonstrating that
Justice Kennedy invokes dignity to refer sometimes to the value of life, sometimes to a
Kantian notion of autonomy, and sometimes to equality).
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Justice Kennedy does not object to all forms of race-conscious government
action. Instead, he emphasizes that the school assignment policies allocated
opportunities by individualized racial classification of applicants -intervening
in a form that in Justice Kennedy's judgment is especially likely to affront
individual dignity and so to exacerbate group division. Had the school districts
simply relied on race-conscious but facially neutral attendance zones to
promote integration- rather than using race to evaluate individual student
applications to magnet schools-Justice Kennedy emphasizes that he would
have upheld the policy.
The position that Justice Kennedy stakes out is not intelligible within a
framework that treats government efforts to integrate as morally
indistinguishable from government efforts to segregate. If a race-conscious
purpose is unconstitutional, how does concealing the aim enhance its
legitimacy? Nor does Justice Kennedy's position make sense within the
antisubordination framework. If government may act to alleviate racial
stratification, why should the form of the intervention matter?
But if social cohesion is the concern, Justice Kennedy's position in Parents
Involved makes more sense. Vindicating equal protection in ways that promote
social cohesion - a sense of attachment shared by all in the community - entails
practical, contextual judgments attentive to the concerns of differently situated
members of the polity. In Justice Kennedy's view, both racial stratification and
its repair each have the potential to balkanize. Left uncorrected, extreme racial
stratification threatens the attachment and sense of membership of minority
citizens-while racial redistribution can excite the aggrievement and
resentment of those who perceive themselves unjustly affected. Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved seems responsive to both these concerns.
Citing the long history of Jim Crow, Justice Kennedy rejects colorblindness as a
workable constitutional rule and interprets the Equal Protection Clause to
allow government to alleviate racial stratification, subject to the constraint that
government employ facially neutral rather than race-based means.
To this point, we have focused on the different grounds that the plurality
and Justice Kennedy offer for limiting the use of racial classifications in
individual admissions policies. Where the plurality emphasizes colorblindness,
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion points to concerns of balkanization and
emphasizes that form matters. In his view, certain race-conscious
interventions - such as race classifications in individualized admissions
decisions - may affront individual dignity and exacerbate group division in a
way that race-conscious, facially neutral policies may not. To make clear that
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his objection to race classifications does not preclude all forms of race-
conscious state action, Justice Kennedy emphasizes that there are race-
conscious, facially neutral policies, such as school districting with attention to
integration, that remain constitutional:
Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have
considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted
to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional
violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the
impact a given approach might have on students of different races."o
Justice Kennedy reasons about constitutional restrictions on racial
classifications of individual applicants in terms that suggest the
constitutionality of facially neutral strategies to integrate, such as "percent
plans" that admit the top high school students across the state to public
universities in order to achieve diversity without affirmative action.
Does disagreement between moderates and conservatives extend to the
kinds of race-conscious but facially neutral policies that Justice Kennedy
expressly affirmed in Parents Involved? In fact, it is not entirely clear whether
and, if so, on what grounds race conservatives oppose such policies. Reflecting
briefly on this puzzle about the constitutionality of race-conscious, facially
neutral policies illuminates ambiguities in the colorblind anticlassification
principle and, in the process, highlights the distinct analytic orientation of the
antibalkanization inquiry.
Proponents of a colorblind Constitution did not originally and may still not
oppose many forms of race-conscious, facially neutral action.91 As we have
seen, battle lines in the dispute between anticlassification and
antisubordination were initially drawn in two classes of constitutional cases -
affirmative action cases and disparate impact cases. In these cases, race
conservatives insisted that (1) all laws using racial classifications should be
subject to strict scrutiny because they violate colorblindness and that (2) laws
with racial disparate impact that do not use racial classifications are
presumptively constitutional, unless plaintiffs could prove discriminatory
purpose." The anticlassification principle focused on the form of state action;
colorblindness meant that government could not classify by race. While race
progressives worried about the constitutionality of laws adopted in awareness
go. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789.
91. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
92. See supra Section I.B.
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of their disparate group impact," conservative proponents of a colorblind
anticlassification principle invoked as fundamental the distinction between
laws that classified and those that did not ("the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees equal laws, not equal results"94) and allowed state action with a
disparate group impact-even state action undertaken in awareness that it
would have disparate group impact -so long as the policy was not intended to
inflict "adverse effects upon an identifiable group.""
93. Proponents of the antisubordination principle advocated judicial oversight of policies with a
disparate racial impact. See supra note 23. In Feeney, progressives on the Court reasoned that
foreseeable disparate impact was relevant in establishing discriminatory purpose. See Pers.
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 283 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("To discern the
purposes underlying facially neutral policies, this Court has therefore considered the degree,
inevitability, and foreseeability of any disproportionate impact as well as the alternatives
reasonably available.").
94. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273 (observing that the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis allowing
plaintiffs to challenge facially neutral laws on the ground that they were motivated by
discriminatory purpose "signaled no departure from the settled rule that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results"); see also id. at 272 ("The calculus of
effects, the manner in which a particular law reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not
a judicial responsibility."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976) ("As an initial
matter, we have difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral
qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory . . . ").
95. The Court first defined discriminatory purpose under the Equal Protection Clause in a case
involving sex discrimination. Conservatives on the Court adopted a narrow definition of
discriminatory purpose in rejecting an equal protection challenge to a law giving preferences
to military veterans in civil service hiring despite the facially neutral policy's plainly
foreseeable adverse impact on women. Even if legislators understood that they were
enacting a preference that would foreseeably steer civil service jobs away from women, the
Court reasoned, legislators had not allocated the jobs with the purpose of inflicting harm on
women. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 ("'[D]iscriminatory purpose,' however, implies more
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
The Court then applied Feeney's definition of discriminatory purpose to a case
involving race discrimination. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-98 (1987)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge to the death penalty that relied on a study
documenting racial disparities in application); id. at 298 ("'[D]iscriminatory purpose' . . .
implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course
of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group. For this claim to prevail, McCleskey would have to prove that the
Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated
racially discriminatory effect." (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Feeney,
442 U.S. at 279)). Courts have invoked this narrow definition of discriminatory purpose to
uphold sentencing guidelines that impose dramatically different sentences for crack and
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At the same time, proponents of a colorblind anticlassification principle
seemed to authorize race-conscious, facially neutral state action undertaken for
the purpose of promoting integration96 -the very position that Justice
Kennedy endorsed in Parents Involved-when the Court imposed a narrow
tailoring requirement in affirmative action cases that asked government
officials to undo effects of past discrimination by facially neutral means before
government could adopt affirmative action programs employing racial
classifications.9 ' As Justice Scalia observed in Croson:
A State can, of course, act "to undo the effects of past
discrimination" in many permissible ways that do not involve
classification by race. In the particular field of state contracting, for
example, it may adopt a preference for small businesses, or even for
new businesses -which would make it easier for those previously
excluded by discrimination to enter the field. Such programs may well
have racially disproportionate impact, but they are not based on race.'8
Conservatives urged government to adopt facially neutral programs as an
alternative to affirmative action; 99 some conservatives even proposed that
cocaine possession. See United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1994)
("Discriminatory purpose 'implies that the decisionmaker, in this case [Congress], selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite
of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."' (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cit. 1992))). See generally Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 23, at 42 (discussing how the Feeney standard is
applied by appellate judges).
g6. See Siegel, supra note 7, at 1512 (describing the understanding, held by proponents of the
anticlassification view, that "a state or local government might adopt race-conscious
districting plans to alleviate de facto segregation, when courts had not construed the
Constitution to require them").
97. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (holding that a
city's race-conscious action was not narrowly tailored in part because "there [did] not
appear to have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral means" and endorsing the
use of race-neutral policies to facilitate racial equality).
98. Id. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring).
99. On facially neutral means of achieving diversity, see Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-908), which posits that "[s]chool districts have a strong
interest in providing a high quality education to all students, and should continue to seek
innovative solutions to improve educational opportunities for all children, including race-
neutral choice and open enrollment programs"; and Letter from Kenneth L. Marcus,
Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Leaders of the Education
Community (Feb. 2004), in OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ACHIEVING
DIVERSITY: RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, at ii, v (2004), which
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governments admit the top percentage of high school graduates to increase the
diversity of undergraduate enrollment. oo
And so, reasoning from constitutional precedents and positions that they
have supported since the 1970s, race conservatives might well agree with
describes "race-neutral means to achieve diversity in educational institutions" and states that
"President George W. Bush has challenged the education community to develop innovative
ways to achieve diversity in our schools without falling back upon illegal quotas." But see Ian
Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1791-93 (1996) (arguing that if affirmative
action programs are subject to strict scrutiny, so too must be race-neutral programs aimed at
benefiting historically oppressed groups, for these programs are "motivated by race");
Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs After Miller
v Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1289, 1310 (1997)
("[C]lass-based preferences that violate the principle against subterfuge are an
unconstitutional alternative to the race-based preferences it is presently denouncing.").
ioo. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22-23, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) (advocating race-neutral alternatives to
affirmative action or "quotas"); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 17-21, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (same); Marcus,
supra note 99, at 6.
In 1997, in response to Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3 d 932, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1996) -a Fifth
Circuit decision holding that the University of Texas could not, consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause, give a preference to black and Mexican-American applicants to achieve
diversity in its student body -the Texas legislature passed, and then-Governor George W.
Bush signed into law, a bill guaranteeing admission to any state university to all students
graduating in the top ten percent of their high school class. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 51.803(a) (West 20o6); see also Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent
Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 245, 252-62 (1996) (examining the legislative history of the
bill to demonstrate that the intent of the legislature was to respond to Hopwood).
In 1999, as part of his "One Florida Initiative," Governor Jeb Bush signed an executive
order ending affirmative action in state employment and education. See Executive Order
Regarding Diversity, Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 1999). Governor Bush
implemented in its stead a "Talented Twenty Program," which guaranteed that students
with grade point averages in the top twenty percent of their respective classes would be
admitted to a state university. See William Yardley, Bush Details Anti-Bias Plan, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. io, 1999, at 1A.
The Fifth Circuit recently considered a challenge to the University of Texas's use of
race as one of several factors in admissions. This suit, funded by conservative advocates,
assumed the constitutionality of percent plans. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d
587 (W.D. Tex. 2009), affirmed, 631 F. 3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011); Morgan Smith, Affirmative
Action Suit Challenges UT Admission Policy, TEX. TRIB., July 21, 2010,
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-education/higher-education/affirmative-action-suit-
challenges-ut-policy. The lawsuit-funded and spearheaded by the Project for Fair
Representation, a conservative organization founded to challenge affirmative action -argues
that the Ten Percent Plan currently in place at UT obviates any need explicitly to consider
race in admissions decisions, making such consideration impermissible under the Equal
Protection Clause. See Smith, supra.
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Justice Kennedy's claim that "a constitutional violation does not occur
whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have
on students of different races.""o' Or, race conservatives might object and
advance colorblindness objections to race-conscious, facially neutral practices
whose constitutionality they have long sanctioned.
Were conservatives to draw on colorblindness to fashion constitutional
objections to facially neutral laws, differences between colorblindness and
antibalkanization would once again come into view. Where antibalkanization
sees in race-conscious, facially neutral policies an opportunity to promote social
cohesion-by repairing de facto segregation, by undoing effects of past or
ongoing discrimination, and by promoting diversity without classifying
individuals by race -race conservatives might object to race-conscious, facially
neutral policies on the ground of purpose, for example, arguing that facially
neutral policies promote "racial balancing"'o2 or are motivated by race. Because
policies that do not employ racial classifications are presumptively
constitutional and subject to rational basis review only, challengers would face
the difficult task of demonstrating discriminatory purpose under prevailing
doctrine, which requires proof that the government acted at least in part to
inflict adverse effects on an identifiable group.o'
There is a small but growing number of race conservatives who argue for
liberalizing proof of discriminatory purpose, in order to attack percent plans
and other facially neutral statutes in which they claim "racial motive"
predominates. (It is not clear whether they mean to liberalize the standard for
proving discriminatory purpose for all plaintiffs or only for those plaintiffs
challenging civil rights initiatives.o 4 ) When proponents of colorblindness
101. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
102. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny ofFacially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas
Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 292 (2001) ("[T]here is something wrong, indeed,
unconstitutional, with a legislative motive to increase the percentage of one racial group in a
state university at the expense of another."); Marcus, supra note 15, at 73 ("Under Ricci and
Parents Involved, the Ten Percent Plan should trigger strict scrutiny to the extent that Texas's
racial motivations predominated in the institution of the plan."). Many conservatives in
government have advocated for percentage plans and other race-neutral means of
integration, see supra notes 99-loo and accompanying text; to this point, opposition to the
plans seems primarily to be expressed by a small group of commentators and movement
conservatives. See, e.g., William Casement, Percentage Plans and College Admissions, AcAD.
QUESTIONS, Dec. 2001, at 8; Editorial, Negative Reaction, NAT'L REv., Feb. 10, 2003, at 12;
Shelby Steele, X-Percent Plans: After Preferences, More Race Games, NAT'L REv., Feb. 7, 2000,
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contest the constitutionality of race-conscious but facially neutral laws that
employ no racial classifications, the claim is potentially vast in reach (does it
reach all civil rights laws? the census?), and the value that colorblindness
vindicates is by no means clear: in these circumstances, the claim to vindicate
the value of individualism is more attenuated,"o' and colorblindness may just as
easily protect racial group differences (and the distributions that result from
them) from government interference.1o 6 In these contexts, colorblindness is
vindicating very different visions and values from those associated with
antibalkanization. As Justice Kennedy made plain in Parents Involved,
antibalkanization understands race relations as an expression not of nature but
of history and allows race-conscious government action that promotes equal
opportunity for all, so long as government acts in ways that promote cohesion.
In the end, Chief Justice Roberts avoided squarely facing the question of
race-conscious, facially neutral state action in his Parents Involved decision,'o,
at 22, 24 (arguing that percentage plans "pursue[] equality in education more by engineering
unequals into institutions than by insisting on their development to parity with others").
To date, conservative critics of percent plans have not argued their constitutional
claims through existing discriminatory purpose doctrine but seem to be arguing for a new
standard of "racial motivation" borrowed from the Voting Rights Act context. See Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). In appealing to Miller rather than Feeney, conservative critics
of the percent plans seem to be advocating a change in the law. Either they are proposing to
make it easier for members of the majority to prove reverse discriminatory purpose claims
than it is now for minorities to prove traditional discriminatory purpose claims, or they are
proposing to alter the standard for proving discriminatory purpose for all plaintiffs.
1o5. But see Richard Primus, The Future ofDisparate Impact, io8 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2010),
which is discussed infra text accompanying notes 194-199.
io6. See Siegel, Colorblind Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 48-59 (analyzing a long-running
tradition of colorblindness arguments devoted to preserving racial difference and protecting
against government social engineering what are deemed to be natural differences in taste
and talent among groups).
107. In Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts questions whether language in the Swann majority
decision permitting school boards, in cases where there is no showing of constitutional
violation, voluntarily to design school attendance zones with the race-conscious goal of
increasing racial integration is appropriately treated as part of the holding of the Swann
decision; he then argues that even if it is, the language in question does not go so far as to
authorize the use of racial classifications in individual admissions decisions-the policy
challenged in Parents Involved. Chief Justice Roberts explains:
The dissent's characterization of Swann as recognizing that "the Equal Protection
Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve
positive race-related goals" is-at best-a dubious inference. Even if the dicta
from Swann were entitled to the weight the dissent would give it, and no dicta is,
it not only did not address the question presented in Swann, it also does not
address the question presented in these cases -whether the school districts' use of
racial classifications to achieve their stated goals is permissible.
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but it was soon to reappear in Ricci, a case in which firefighters challenged the
City of New Haven's decision to set aside a promotion test because of concerns
about its racially disparate effects -effects that the City was concerned might
put the municipality in violation of the prohibition on employment practices
with a racial disparate impact under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. In oral
argument in Ricci, Chief Justice Roberts seemed in fact to suggest that he had
accepted as constitutional race-conscious school siting decisions in Parents
Involved:
Can I get back just-just-since I don't understand it yet, the
distinction between intentional racial discrimination and race conscious
action. I thought both the plurality and the concurrence in Parents
Involved accepted the fact that race conscious action such as school
siting or drawing district lines is - is okay, but discriminating in
particular assignments is not. "o
If the Constitution allows "race conscious action such as school siting or
drawing district lines," was New Haven's concern about the disparate impact
of its promotion exam a sufficient reason to readminister the test? If not, why
not? The answer to this question changes shape when analyzed with attention
to values of colorblindness and antibalkanization.
III.RICCI AND ANTIBALKANIZATION
In Ricci v. DeStefano,' 9 white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter sued
the City of New Haven, alleging that the City violated the Equal Protection
Clause and federal employment discrimination law (Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Acto) when the City threw out the results of a civil service exam upon
learning that the exam would preclude promoting virtually all minorities for
two years, citing concern that its use of this test might have a racial disparate
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 738 (2007) (plurality
opinion). This passage leaves unsettled the question of whether Chief Justice Roberts would
allow the traditional forms of race-conscious, facially neutral state action, such as drawing
school district lines with attention to their effects on integration, that Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion expressly affirms.
io8. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2oo9) (No. 07-
1428).
109. 129 S. Ct. 2658.
11o. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at
4 2 U.S.C. 5 2000e (2006)).
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impact in violation of Title VII." The Court ruled that the City had engaged in
impermissible disparate treatment in violation of Title VII, in a five-to-four
decision written by Justice Kennedy that expressly avoided reaching the
constitutional question. Declaring for the first time that there was a tension
between Title VII's prohibition of racial disparate treatment and its prohibition
of practices with a racial disparate impact, the Court then drew on its
constitutional affirmative action decisions to hold that an employer needed a
strong basis in evidence that the statute was violated before it could throw out
a test which applicants such as the plaintiffs had taken."'
On an initial reading, Justice Kennedy's opinion is ambiguous, unclear in
its implications for disparate impact law and for equal protection. Does Ricci
restrict disparate impact law generally-or only in cases where employers, for
expressly racial reasons, decline to hire or promote on the basis of scores earned
on employment tests that they have already administered? Further, does Ricci
address Title VII only, or might the decision have constitutional
implications?"' If so, has Justice Kennedy changed course from his position in
Parents Involved, when he held that government could act to promote
integration where it acted by facially neutral means? Or is Justice Kennedy
responding to particular features of the Ricci case -New Haven's decision to
readminister a civil service exam for the publicly stated reason that scarcely any
minority candidates would have been promoted under the first exam?
In what follows, I briefly review disparate impact law, which, like equal
protection law, has been the locus of conflict between race conservatives and
race progressives in the last several decades. I then turn to the Ricci decision
itself, identifying ambiguities in the scope and grounds of the Court's holding.
Finally, I read Ricci in light of the concerns with balkanization at the heart of
Justice Kennedy's Parents Involved concurrence. The antibalkanzation reading
identifies the race dynamics of retesting rather than disparate impact law itself
as the locus of liability in the case. As importantly, the antibalkanization
reading provides independent reason for the preservation of disparate impact
inquiry. The disparate impact framework encourages employers to avoid using
promotion tests with racial disparate impact unless such tests are warranted by
business needs; the facts of Ricci vividly illustrate how use of employment tests
iii. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664. Implemented in accordance with the city's promotion procedures,
the exam would have resulted in the promotion of two Latino and no African-American
firefighters. See infra Section III.B.
112. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.
113. See id. at 2675 ("Our cases discussing constitutional principles can provide helpful guidance
in this statutory context.").
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with racial disparate impact that are not clearly justified by business necessity
can exacerbate workplace polarization.
A. A Short Primer on the Law and Politics ofDisparate Impact Law
As the Supreme Court first recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"'
federal employment discrimination law makes unlawful facially neutral
employment practices with a racial disparate impact, unless an employer can
show that the practice is justified by business necessity."s As the Court
reasoned, Title VII respects employers' freedom to organize their business as
they see fit but requires employers to ensure that any selection criteria that
entrench minority exclusion in fact serve business needs.
The disparate impact claim is designed to counteract several kinds of bias:
(1) to smoke out covert discriminatory purpose; (2) to challenge subconscious
employer bias; and (3) to challenge structural discrimination -discrimination
that arises from the interaction of workplace criteria with other race-salient
social practices. For example, in Griggs, the plaintiffs challenged job
requirements of a high school diploma and scores on a standardized test on the
grounds that these requirements had a racial disparate impact and did not test
skills needed to perform the jobs in question."' The defendant employer had
engaged in openly race-based hiring until the effective date of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act;"' yet in requiring the employer to show that the facially neutral
114. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
115. See id. at 431 ("The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited.").
116. Id. at 425-26.
n17. The Griggs opinion observes:
When the Company abandoned its policy of restricting Negroes to the Labor
Department in 1965, completion of high school also was made a prerequisite to
transfer from Labor to any other department. From the time the high school
requirement was instituted to the time of trial, however, white employees hired
before the time of the high school education requirement continued to perform
satisfactorily and achieve promotions in the "operating" departments. Findings
on this score are not challenged.
The Company added a further requirement for new employees on July 2,
1965, the date on which Title VII became effective. To qualify for placement in
any but the Labor Department it became necessary to register satisfactory scores
on two professionally prepared aptitude tests, as well as to have a high school
education. Completion of high school alone continued to render employees
eligible for transfer to the four desirable departments from which Negroes had
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but racially exclusionary requirements were job-related, the Court did not
emphasize themes of covert discriminatory purpose. Instead, in holding that
the employer could not use a selection criterion such as a standardized test with
a racial disparate impact unless the exam tested for skills needed to do the job,
Griggs adverted to the recent segregation of the North Carolina public schools,
observing that "[b]ecause they are Negroes, petitioners have long received
inferior education in segregated schools.""" The Court explained: "Under the
Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo
of prior discriminatory employment practices."" 9 As Griggs reasoned,
discrimination does not consist only in isolated or aberrant individual bad acts
but occurs in a larger societal context; for this reason even facially neutral
employment criteria can become racially salient as they interact with norms and
practices outside the workplace.
While disparate impact doctrine requires no showing of intent,2 o disparate
impact law is also understood as a constraint on the individual bad actor. In
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,' 2' decided several years after Griggs, the Court set
out the framework for proving disparate impact claims. If the complaining
party makes out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that "the tests
in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern
significantly different from that of the pool of applicants," then the employer
has the "'burden of showing that any given requirement [has] ... a manifest
relationship to the employment in question." 2 The Court then asserted that
plaintiffs could rebut an employer's showing of business necessity, describing
this rebuttal as a demonstration of "pretext":
If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are
"job related," it remains open to the complaining party to show that
other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial
effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in "efficient
been excluded if the incumbent had been employed prior to the time of the new
requirement.
Id. at 427-28.
118. Id. at 430.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 432 ("[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.").
121. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
122. Id. at 425 (alterations in original) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
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and trustworthy workmanship." Such a showing would be evidence
that the employer was using its tests merely as a "pretext" for
discrimination.2 3
The disparate impact framework thus attempts to limit the effects of
structural discrimination and to constrain covert or quasi-conscious bias by
requiring that if an employer hires using a test or criterion with a significant
racial disparate impact, the employer can show that the test assesses skills
actually needed to perform the job. If selection criteria with a racial disparate
impact are shown to be job-related, any exclusion that results is deemed to be
on the basis of merit; but if the selection criteria with racial disparate impact
are not shown to be job-related, then the resulting exclusion is deemed to be
"on the basis of race." Griggs thus makes job qualifications a ground of race
neutrality."
In the years after Griggs, judges and administrators began to apply
disparate impact as a framework for identifying discrimination in a variety of
contexts under federal law, including Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
which bars discrimination in programs that receive federal funding;"' and a
number of courts employed disparate impact as a framework for interpreting
123. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). The language of
pretext was drawn from the framework generally established for proving Title VII
discrimination claims in the 1973 decision of McDonnell Douglas.
124. The Court reasons:
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures;
obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices
and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable
measure of job performance. Congress has not commanded that the less qualified
be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from
disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such qualifications the
controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436; see also Siegel, supra note 21, at 95-96 (observing that the Griggs
disparate impact theory of liability rests on an understanding of structural discrimination
that identifies job-relatedness or market functionality as a ground of race neutrality).
125. 42 U.S.C §§ 20ood to 2000d-7 (2oo6). On the spread of disparate impact law in the decades
after Griggs, see Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Margaret B. Kwoka, Title VI Disparate Impact
Claims Would Not Harm National Security-A Response to Paul Taylor, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
503, 509 (2009) ("In an early case interpreting Title VI, Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court
'squarely held . . . that Title VI forbids the use of federal funds not only in programs that
intentionally discriminate on racial grounds but also in those endeavors that have a
disparate impact on racial minorities."' (alteration in original) (quoting Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 589 (1983))); and id. at Sio ("For almost forty years,
private citizens aggrieved by discriminatory federally-funded programs had brought suits
based on disparate impact under a variety of agency regulations.").
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the Equal Protection Clause."' These developments in turn prompted
energetic conservative criticism of disparate impact law.
While those who support disparate impact liability interpret existing race
stratification as, in significant part, reflecting the legacy of discrimination -the
presumption from which the Court reasoned in Griggs' 27-disparate impact's
critics are inclined to interpret the underrepresentation of minorities as
evidence of racial group differences in taste or aptitude"' and so to see
126. In rejecting disparate impact as a framework for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause in
1976, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a number of circuit courts had viewed the
framework as appropriate for identifying violations of the Equal Protection Clause:
Both before and after Palmer v. Thompson, however, various Courts of
Appeals have held in several contexts, including public employment, that the
substantially disproportionate racial impact of a statute or official practice
standing alone and without regard to discriminatory purpose, suffices to prove
racial discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause absent some
justification going substantially beyond what would be necessary to validate most
other legislative classifications. The cases impressively demonstrate that there is
another side to the issue; but, with all due respect, to the extent that those cases
rested on or expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is
unnecessary in making out an equal protection violation, we are in disagreement.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 244 n.12
(collecting cases addressing public employment); United States v. City of New York, 683 F.
Supp. 2d 225, 238-40 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the district court had found the New
York Fire Department selection exam to violate the Equal Protection Clause under a
disparate impact analysis in Vulcan Soc'y of New York City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 360 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a ruling that the Second Circuit upheld the
same year, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973)).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 118-119; see also Siegel, supra note 21, at 95-96 (observing
that Griggs reasons from a historical understanding of race).
128. See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, Disparate Impact Dogma, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (July 7, 2009),
http://article.nationalreview.com/399347/disparate-impact-dogma/thomas-sowell ("A key
notion that has created unending mischief -from its introduction by the Supreme Court in
1971 to the current firefighters' case-is that of 'disparate impact.' Any employment
requirement that one racial or ethnic group meets far more often than another group is said
to have a disparate impact and is considered evidence of racial discrimination. In other
words, if group X doesn't pass a test nearly as often as group Y, then there is something
wrong with the test, according to this reasoning-or lack of reasoning. This implicitly
assumes that there cannot be any great difference between the two groups in their skills,
talents, or efforts.").
Conservative critics of civil rights law have long raised this objection. See, e.g., NATHAN
GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION 63 (1975) (arguing that "[flederal agencies persist"
in "reduc[ing] all differences in labor force distribution ... to discrimination" while, in fact,
many other factors, including "taste or, if you will, culture" are at work); CHARLES MURRAY,
WHAT IT MEANS To BE A LIBERTARIAN 85 (1997) ("At any moment in history a completely
fair system for treating individuals will produce different outcomes for different groups,
1320
120:1278 2011
FROM COLORBLINDNESS TO ANTIBALKANIZATION
disparate impact liability as creating incentives for employers to engage in
"quota" hiring of persons who do not belong in their workplace.129 Initially
race conservatives opposed adoption of the disparate impact framework as a
constitutional liability rule, a dispute they won with the Court's 1976 decision
in Washington v. Davis' that plaintiffs would have to establish proof of
discriminatory purpose to challenge facially neutral state action under the
Equal Protection Clause. 3' Soon thereafter disparate impact's critics persuaded
the Court to reverse its decision recognizing a disparate impact claim under
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 3 2 By the late 198os, conservative judges
had so eviscerated disparate impact under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act 33 that Congress reinstated the Griggs framework through the 1991 Civil
because groups are hardly ever equally represented in the qualities that go into decisions
about whom to hire, admit to law school, put in jail, or live next door to."); Dinesh
D'Souza, Improving Culture To End Racism, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 785, 788-89 (1996)
("Merit produces inequality ... between groups. . . . The real problem is that African-
Americans are not competitive with other groups in our society."); see also Matthew J.
Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned To Live with Racial Inequality, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 87, 117-20 (20o6) ("If the colorblind marketplace functions as its proponents believe-
as a competitive meritocracy that justly distributes rewards according to individual desert-
it requires only a short logical step to infer that its outcomes accurately register the relative
talent, effort, skill, or merit of the individual competitors."); cf Siegel, Colorblind
Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 48 ("[I]f one follows the logic of concerns about
proportional representation and racial social engineering expressed in Croson and Hopwood,
it appears that strict scrutiny doctrines under the Fourteenth Amendment radically restrict
the use of race-conscious remedies in order to protect and preserve real differences among
racial groups. To say the least, this is a counterintuitive ambition for a body of law that
embraces as its 'ultimate goal' the purpose of 'eliminating entirely from governmental
decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's race."' (quoting City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion))).
129. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," a Codification of
Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287
(1993). For discussion of the shifting meaning of "quotas," see infra note 135.
130. 426 U.S. 229.
131. At the time the Court decided Davis, a number of circuits viewed the disparate impact
framework as of constitutional as well as statutory relevance. Id. at 244 n.12 (collecting
cases); see also supra note 126 (quoting the Court's discussion of these cases in Davis).
132. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (holding that agencies could not
provide a private right of action to people who suffered disparate impact discrimination);
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (holding that the statutory
language of Title VI did not prohibit disparate impact discrimination); see also Kirkpatrick &
Kwoka, supra note 125, at 509-11 (reconstructing the case law that first recognized a
disparate impact cause of action under Title VI and then progressively overruled it).
133. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652 (1989) (shifting burden of
proving business necessity from disparate impact defendant to plaintiff); id. ("The Court of
Appeals' theory, at the very least, would mean that any employer who had a segment of his
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Rights Restoration Act, which codified disparate impact as an express part of
federal employment discrimination law.'34 Criticizing Congress's effort to
reinstate burden-of-proof rules for the disparate impact cause of action,
conservative critics of the Act assailed it as a "quota" bill,' yet they did not
work force that was-for some reason-racially imbalanced, could be haled into court and
forced to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of defending the 'business
necessity' of the methods used to select the other members of his work force. The only
practicable option for many employers would be to adopt racial quotas, insuring that no
portion of their work forces deviated in racial composition from the other portions thereof;
this is a result that Congress expressly rejected in drafting Title VII. The Court of Appeals'
theory would 'leave the employer little choice .. . but to engage in a subjective quota system
of employment selection. This, of course, is far from the intent of Title VII."' (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449
(1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment))); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (plurality opinion) ("We agree that the inevitable focus on
statistics in disparate impact cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt
inappropriate prophylactic measures. It is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful
discrimination is the sole cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and employers in accord
with the laws of chance. It would be equally unrealistic to suppose that employers can
eliminate, or discover and explain, the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical
imbalances in the composition of their work forces. Congress has specifically provided that
employers are not required to avoid 'disparate impact' as such ..... (citation omitted)); id.
at 993 ("If quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means of
avoiding expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such measures will be
widely adopted. The prudent employer will be careful to ensure that its programs are
discussed in euphemistic terms, but will be equally careful to ensure that the quotas are met.
Allowing the evolution of disparate impact analysis to lead to this result would be contrary
to Congress' clearly expressed intent, and it should not be the effect of our decision today.").
134. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k) (20o6)).
135. President George H.W. Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990 on the grounds that it
would force employers to adopt quotas. 136 CONG. REC. 31,827, 31,828 (1990) ("[T]he bill
actually employs a maze of highly legalistic language to introduce the destructive force of
quotas into our Nation's employment system.").
Though President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, stating that "[t]his law will
not lead to quotas," Presidential Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1701, 1701 (Nov. 21, 1991), other critics insisted that the bill
was a "quota bill" in part because it sought to reinstate the framework for proving a
disparate impact claim prevailing before the Court's 1988 Ward's Cove decision. Dissenting
members of the House Judiciary Committee published in the bill's committee report an
extended discussion of why the bill was "a quota bill." H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 58-63
(1991). They essentially equated hiring with an awareness of "the numbers" with quota-
based hiring. Id., pt. 2, at 68-69. Some conservative opponents of the disparate impact
standard were candid about the expansion of the range of practices to which they applied
the term "quota." A Heritage Foundation report on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 defined a
"quota bill" as follows:
1322
120:1278 2011
FROM COLORBLINDNESS TO ANTI BALKANIZATION
contend that the statute imposing disparate impact liability violated equal
protection.' Despite disparate impact's codification in 1991, judges are quite
conservative in enforcing the framework. 137
In its original, narrow usage, the term "quotas" referred only to the practice of
setting aside a fixed number or percentage of employment positions for members
of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or ethnic group. In recent debates over
civil rights legislation, however, the term has come to be used for all forms of
race-conscious decision-making or preferential treatment based on group
membership, including such terms as "goals" and "timetables." The term
"quotas" also refers to laws that force employers to abandon perfectly legitimate
hiring practices simply because they happen to produce statistical disparities
between the racial or ethnic composition of an employer's work force and that of
the general population. This broadened definition is more in line with the
commonly understood idea of a quota. Thus, a policy of giving job applicants an
advantage in the hiring process merely because they are, say, black or Hispanic,
would count as a quota, as would a policy of always choosing a minority
whenever two applicants are otherwise equally qualified.
A bill can fairly be classified as a quota bill if its effect would be to give an
employer the incentive to adopt quotas to protect himself from potential lawsuits
based on the percentage of minorities in his work force. Or it would be a quota
bill if it changes the rules of civil litigation to make it impossible for victims of
employment discrimination to challenge quota plans adopted by employers under
court order or in settlement of prior litigation.
William G. Laffer III, The "Danforth" Compromise: Another Quota Civil Rights Bill, HERITAGE
FOUND. 1 (Oct. 7, 1991), http://web.archive.org/web/2oo6o1191oloo4/http://
www.heritage.org/Research/Religion/upload/89897 i.pdf.
For an exhaustive analysis of the discourse on quotas in the debates over the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, see Robin Stryker, Martha Scarpellino & Mellisa Holtzman, Political Culture
Wars 1990s Style: The Drum Beat of Quotas in Media Framing of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
17 RES. Soc. STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY 33, 55-65 (1999), which analyzes the usage of
"quotas" in editorials supporting and opposing civil rights legislation codifying the
disparate impact cause of action in federal employment discrimination law.
136. Conservative views about disparate impact in the 1980s are expressed in an important report
from the Department of Justice during Ronald Reagan's presidency, see OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1988), which
displayed concern that the Supreme Court might "'constitutionalize' the 'disparate impact'
definition of discrimination by extending the Griggs analysis to the equal protection area,"
id. at 5o, expressed skepticism about the statutory interpretation underlying the Court's
disparate impact decisions, id., and noted the possibility that the Court "may reinstate the
intent requirement for claims brought under the Civil Rights Acts," id. at 55, but did not
consider the possibility that the Constitution prohibited Congress from imposing disparate
impact liability. (For an account of the historical significance of this Constitution in 2ooo
report, see Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 221-23 (20o8)).
Some critics of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 were prepared to attack the Act in
constitutional terms but did so without challenging the constitutionality of the Act's
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B. The Ricci Facts
Disparate impact liability is at the heart of the events leading to the Ricci
case. In 2003, the City of New Haven administered promotional exams in order
to fill vacant Lieutenant and Captain positions in its fire department.' The
City hired a firm that specializes in creating exams for public safety
departments to design the tests, which, by contract with the firefighters union,
were required to have a written component (worth sixty percent of the total
score) and an oral component (worth forty percent). The City's civil service
rules provided that promotional lists would be created, listing in rank-order
those firefighters who passed the test, and that vacancies would be filled by the
"Rule of Three"-a rule that allows only the top three candidates on a
promotion list to be considered for a vacancy. Only nineteen of the seventy-
seven firefighters who took the Lieutenant's exam were African-American; only
six of them passed. In contrast, of forty-three Caucasian candidates, twenty-six
passed the exam. Similarly, whereas eighteen of the twenty-five white
candidates for Captain passed the exam, only three of the eight black
candidates did so. These test results, combined with the Rule of Three, meant
that only white candidates would be considered for Lieutenant vacancies and
that the Captain's promotions would be distributed among seven white
firefighters and two Latinos. In a city where African-Americans account for
approximately forty percent of the population and Latinos twenty percent," 9
the test results promised that no African-Americans and scarcely any Latinos
would be promoted for the fifteen openings for the next two years.
New Haven's Civil Service Board held five hearings to determine whether
to certify the test results, during which time the Board publicly released the
codification of disparate impact liability. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Bush's Quota Bill:
(Dubious) Politics Trumps Legal Principle, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1991, at A17 (arguing that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 is "a quota bill" but challenging as unconstitutional only the
provision "depriving third parties of the right to challenge consent decrees"). A 2003 article
in the Harvard Law Review claimed to be the "first serious consideration" of whether
statutory disparate impact liability might violate the Equal Protection Clause. Richard A.
Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 497
(2003).
137. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
734-53 (2oo6).
138. Unless otherwise specified, these facts are drawn from the joint appendix filed with the
Supreme Court in Ricci, see Joint Appendix, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009)
(Nos. 07-1428, o8-328), and the district court opinion in the case, see Ricci v. DeStefano,
554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145-51 (D. Conn. 20o6).
139. See New Haven (City) QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quicldacts.census.gov/qfd/states/09/o9520oo.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
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applicants' test scores by race (though not by name). After hours of testimony
from attorneys, experts, and residents - and an acrimonious public debate - the
City decided to throw out the test results and arrange for a new exam.
Although none of the candidates knew their results, a group of white test-
takers and one Hispanic brought suit, alleging that New Haven's decision to
throw out the exam violated their rights under Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' claims.o4
C. Ambiguities in Ricci's Holding: Colorblindness or Antibalkanization?
In Ricci, the Supreme Court divided five to four in favor of the firefighters.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held that the City's decision to
throw out the exam results was unlawful disparate treatment in violation of
Title VII; the majority indicated that the statutory holding avoided the
constitutional question of equal protection, to which the Justices nonetheless
repeatedly averted.' 4'
Ricci is remarkably unclear in explaining how the City engaged in disparate
treatment in violation of Title VII. What aspects of the City's conduct were
unlawful? Some read the decision as holding that New Haven engaged in
unlawful disparate treatment because the City considered the likely racial
impact of its civil service exam, that the effort to avoid disparate impact liability
itself is "discriminatory"*-a theory of the case that Justice Scalia emphasizes
140. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, affd, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008).
141. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676 ("Our statutory holding does not address the constitutionality of
the measures taken here in purported compliance with Title VII. We also do not hold that
meeting the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in
a future case.").
142. Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Helen Norton, The Supreme Court's Post Racial Turn
Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding ofEquality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 229 (suggesting
that on one reading disparate impact liability is constitutionally suspect, as "[t]he Court
now, however, appears to treat a decision maker's attention to the disparities experienced by
members of traditionally subordinated racial groups- that is, its antisubordination ends - as
inextricable from an intent to discriminate against others, and thus sufficiently suspicious to
demand justification"); Primus, supra note 1o5, at 1344 (suggesting that one reading of Ricci,
a "general reading," is that "[d]isparate impact doctrine is race conscious; equal protection
requires racial neutrality," and thus "the two are not compatible"). Primus, whose article is
discussed below in the text accompanying notes 194-202, observes:
It is possible to understand Title VII's disparate impact doctrine in several
different ways, but on any construction it is race-conscious. Courts must classify
members of the workforce by race in order to adjudicate disparate impact claims,
and the threat of liability encourages employers to classify their employees or
applicants by race so as to monitor their own compliance with the law. Moreover,
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in his concurring opinion. 14  If that is what Ricci holds, then Justice Kennedy
would seem to be suggesting that a government's decision to select a facially
disparate impact doctrine is concerned with racial groups, and the colorblind
version of equal protection insists that the law's attention be on individuals. If
equal protection requires the law to be thoroughly colorblind, then a statutory
doctrine that requires racial classification and makes liability turn on the status of
groups considered collectively is an equal protection problem.
Id. at 1363 (footnotes omitted); cf Joseph Seiner & Benjamin Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a
New Disparate Impact?, go B.U. L. REV. 2181, 2213 (2010) ("[F]or the first time in disparate-
impact law, the employer's state of mind would be relevant to the analysis. . . . Now the
claims would also turn on what the employer knew and what conclusions it drew [about the
impact of the facially neutral employment policy].") This account of disparate impact's
constitutional vulnerability might well extend to disparate treatment liability under Title VII
and potentially to a wide variety of inquiries into civil rights and racial justice.
143. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia challenges disparate impact liability in ways that the
majority does not. Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia suggests that Congress's decision to
enact the civil rights law may have been unconstitutional:
[I]f the Federal Government is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of
race, then surely it is also prohibited from enacting laws mandating that third
parties-e.g., employers, whether private, State, or municipal -discriminate on
the basis of race. As the facts of these cases illustrate, Title VII's disparate-impact
provisions place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate
the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of)
those racial outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains,
discriminatory. Personal Administration of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979).
To be sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas,
but it is not clear why that should provide a safe harbor. . . . Intentional
discrimination is still occurring, just one step up the chain. Government
compulsion of such design would therefore seemingly violate equal protection
principles.... And of course the purportedly benign motive for the disparate-
Impact provisions cannot save the statute. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)-
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphases added) (citations omitted). In
this passage, Justice Scalia contends that disparate impact liability violates equal protection,
but the cases he cites do not support this claim. The type of race-conscious decisionmaking
that Justice Scalia terms "discriminatory" -or more colorfully refers to as placing "a racial
thumb on the scales" -is facially neutral state action. As we have seen, there is a developed
body of equal protection case law governing equal protection challenges to facially neutral
state action that has a disparate impact on identifiable groups. See supra notes 93-95 and
accompanying text.
To show that facially neutral state action with disparate racial impact is discriminatory,
the Court ruled in Feeney that the challenged action must be undertaken at least in part
because of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. See Pets. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279 (1979) ("Discriminatory purpose, however, implies more than intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,'
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neutral policy that promotes employee diversity -the very sort of decision he
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted)). Thus, to sustain his allegation, Justice Scalia would have to show that in
enacting Title VII, (1) Congress acted (2) with a purpose to inflict adverse effects upon an
identifiable group. Justice Scalia offers no evidence whatsoever to support that proposition.
Congress had numerous reasons to enact the civil rights laws having nothing to do with a
purpose to harm whites (just as, in Feeney, Massachusetts had numerous reasons to enact
veteran preferences in civil service employment having nothing to do with a purpose to
harm women). These numerous benign purposes establish the constitutionality of the
statute under prevailing equal protection case law.
Justice Scalia states the law exactly backwards when he invokes Adarand for the
proposition that a "purportedly benign motive" for a facially neutral law "cannot save the
statute." The Adarand case that Justice Scalia cites sets forth the law governing cases where
the government has employed a racial classification and triggered the presumption of
unconstitutionality. Under Davis and Feeney, facially neutral action undertaken for a
purportedly benign motive is presumptively constitutional; a challenging party bears the
burden of proof that the purportedly benign motive conceals an intent to inflict adverse
effects on a particular group.
Justice Scalia offers no evidence that Congress acted with discriminatory purpose under
Feeney, and he acknowledges that Congress mandated no quotas in the civil rights laws, but
he goes on to suggest that in codifying disparate impact law, Congress compelled employers
to engage in intentional discrimination. He offers no evidence of that claim (in what
constitutionally relevant sense is adopting facially neutral laws "compulsion" of "intentional
discrimination"?). Here Justice Scalia is implicitly recalling (and constitutionalizing) policy
arguments against disparate impact liability advanced in the 198os and 199os, when
conservatives attacked disparate impact laws that exposed employers to potential liability for
discrimination as imposing "quotas" because, they argued, the statute created incentives for
employers to avoid litigation by increasing minorities in their workforce. See supra notes 135-
137 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia's innovative equal protection claim is a remarkable
act of "legislating from the bench." Congress rejected this policy argument and enacted the
1991 Civil Rights Act for a range of reasons, none of which Justice Scalia has shown to be
discriminatory within the meaning of Feeney.
If the concerns that prompted Congress to enact the 1991 Act are discriminatory,
Justice Scalia is (i) raising concerns about the constitutionality of all antidiscrimination laws
and (2) expanding the meaning of discriminatory purpose in ways that would make it much
easier for minority plaintiffs to challenge facially neutral laws with a foreseeable racial
disparate impact (unless he means to alter the framework for proving discriminatory
purpose only for white plaintiffs challenging civil rights laws).
In short, Justice Scalia suggests that government imposition of disparate impact
liability might violate equal protection, but the cases that he cites (but does not discuss) do
not support the propositions of law he asserts. Nor does Justice Scalia square his suggestion
that disparate impact liability might be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
with his own opinion in Croson suggesting that "[a] State can, of course, act 'to undo the
effects of past discrimination' in many permissible ways that do not involve classification by
race.. .. Such programs may well have racially disproportionate impact, but they are not
based on race." City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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went out of his way to affirm in Parents Involved-violates Title VII and
possibly the Equal Protection Clause as well.14
144. Kenneth Marcus, who directed the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights under President
George W. Bush, reads Ricci expansively, construes Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in
Parents Involved in light of this expansive reading of Ricci, and then suggests that disparate
impact law is only constitutional if narrowed, concluding that the "the Court may be forced
to strike down the disparate-impact provision and encourage Congress to reenact it without
its problematic features." Marcus, supra note 15, at 8o.
On Marcus's reading of Ricci, facially neutral state action is unconstitutional when the
racial motive predominates. See id. at 72 ("Taking Ricci and Parents Involved together, the
Court has established that racially neutral governmental actions with a predominant racial
motive trigger both strict scrutiny and disparate-treatment analysis."). While Justice Scalia
identifies Feeney as the equal protection case defining discriminatory purpose, see supra note
143, Marcus omits discussion of the case and instead relies on Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Miller v. Johnson, 5 U.S. 900 (1995), which applies strict scrutiny to district lines adopted
in compliance with the Voting Rights Act when "race was the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or
without a particular district," 51s U.S. at 916.
Marcus plainly intends this new framework to trigger strict scrutiny review of many
race-conscious, facially neutral laws and policies. See Marcus, supra note 15, at 72-73 ("The
scope of decisions covered by this new rule is potentially broad, encompassing racially
motivated decisions by school districts to redraw school boundaries or employ
socioeconomic factors in student assignment decisions, state universities to institute
percent-rank plans, and private universities to give admissions or financial aid preferences
on the basis of either student economic status or such factors as whether a student is the first
person in his family to attend college. In all of these cases, strict scrutiny and disparate treatment
analysis are both triggered." (emphasis added)).
Absent any account of what counts as a "racial motivation," Marcus's proposed liability
rule would seem to subject all civil rights statutes to strict scrutiny. Which civil rights laws
would survive strict scrutiny? Marcus proposes an account of "predominant racial motive"
that would separate constitutional from unconstitutional concern about race discrimination
and so determine which kinds of civil rights laws survive strict scrutiny.
Marcus argues that, under Ricci, disparate impact remains constitutional if the liability
rule is adopted to rectify hard-to-prove intentional or unconscious discrimination. See id. at
70 ("[T]o the extent that the disparate-impact provision is narrowly construed as a means to
limit intentional or even unconscious discrimination, the conflict [with disparate treatment
and equal protection] dissolves."). But Marcus then goes on to suggest that racial motives
predominated in the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which codified disparate
impact liability under Title VII; he suggests that the 1991 law was not enacted for the
primary purpose of rectifying hard-to-prove intentional or unconscious discrimination but
instead was enacted for the purpose of achieving "diversity," "racial balance," or "quotas" in
the workplace. See id. at 66 ("Congressional motives may have included a desire to increase
racial diversity in the workforce other than by reducing discrimination. Former White
House counsel Boyden Gray has disclosed that a 'principal motivation' for the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, which codified the disparate-impact provision, was to achieve racial balancing.
Some critics opposed the disparate-impact provision of the 1991 Act on the ground that it
was a 'government mandate for proportional quotas."' (citations omitted) (quoting Michael
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There are certain passages of Ricci that could be read to say that selecting
an employment test with awareness that it will increase diversity is unlawful
under Title VII. Here is an example of a passage in the Ricci majority opinion
suggesting that the ground of liability is bad motive, purpose, or justification:
All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the
examination results because of the statistical disparity based on race-
i.e., how minority candidates had performed when compared to white
candidates. As the District Court put it, the City rejected the test results
because "too many whites and not enough minorities would be
promoted were the lists to be certified." 554 F. Supp. 2d, at 152; see also
ibid. (respondents' "own arguments ... show that the City's reasons for
advocating non-certification were related to the racial distribution of
the results"). Without some other justification, this express, race-based
decisionmaking violates Title VII's command that employers cannot
take adverse employment actions because of an individual's race. See
§ 2000e-2(a)(1)."'
But if concern about the racial disparate impact of selection devices was an
illegitimate racial motive, as the decision at a few points might be read to
suggest,146 Griggs itself would be encouraging unlawful race-based
Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1153
(1993)))-
In the foregoing article, Professor Marcus seems to take a position that is in some
tension with views he expressed in government. KENNETH L. MARCUs, OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ACHIEVING DIVERSITY: RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION (2004), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/edlite
-raceneutralreport2.html (describing "race-neutral means to achieve diversity in educational
institutions" and stating that "President George W. Bush has challenged the education
community to develop innovative ways to achieve diversity in our schools without falling
back upon illegal quotas").
145. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673.
146. The following passage uneasily characterizes the ground of liability in terms that slide from
purpose to motive to conduct to justification:
Whatever the City's ultimate aim-however well intentioned or benevolent it
might have seemed - the City made its employment decision because of race. The
City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were
white. The question is not whether that conduct was discriminatory but whether
the City had a lawful justification for its race-based action.
Id. at 2674. The claim that the City "rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring
candidates were white" is in fact inaccurate unless we credit facts in Justice Alito's
concurring opinion not contained in the majority opinion, which suggest that racial malice
of some kind was animating the City's decision. Id. at 2683-89 (Alito, J., concurring). The
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decisionmaking; so would the Court's own requirement of narrow tailoring in
affirmative action cases, which asks the government to try to integrate by
facially neutral means before employing affirmative action -a requirement that
even Justice Scalia has endorsed.1 17 If an employer's concern about the
disparate impact of its selection criteria is an unlawful reason for changing
those criteria, how can an employer voluntarily comply with Title VII without
violating the statute?148
In fact, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Ricci, expressly refuses
to adopt an interpretation of disparate treatment law that makes an employer's
efforts to comply voluntarily with Title VII per se unlawful44 and explains:
Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before
administering a test or practice, how to design that test or practice in
order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their
race. And when, during the test-design stage, an employer invites
comments to ensure the test is fair, that process can provide a common
ground for open discussions toward that end."0
facts contained in the majority opinion suggest that the City threw out the results not out of
hostility to whites, but (1) out of its interest in ensuring that its test produced an applicant
pool that included some minorities and (2) out of concern that its selection device might
violate Title VII's disparate impact provisions.
147. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 528. For discussion, see supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
148. Even that account of liability would not amount to discriminatory purpose in a
constitutional sense. That showing entails a showing, at least in part, that the decisionmaker
was adopting the challenged action at least in part because of its "adverse effects" on a racial
group. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 ("'[D]iscriminatory purpose,' however, implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker,
in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
For one reading of Ricci suggesting that the Court has inadvertently liberalized the
framework for proving disparate treatment liability under the statute, see Michael J.
Zimmer, Ricci's Color-Blind Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended
Consequences? (Loyola Univ. Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp.,
Paper No. 2009-0020), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=1529438.
149. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674 ("Petitioners would have us hold that, under Title VII, avoiding
unintentional discrimination cannot justify intentional discrimination. That assertion,
however, ignores the fact that, by codifying the disparate-impact provision in 1991,
Congress has expressly prohibited both types of discrimination. We must interpret the
statute to give effect to both provisions where possible.").
150. Id. at 2677 (emphasis added).
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Considering the racial disparate impact of a test before the test is administered
is lawful, while considering the racial disparate impact of a test after the test is
administered is not. If Ricci had extended the colorblindness principle to
require neutrality in facially neutral practices, then it should not matter
whether an employer considered the potential racial impact of a test before or
after officially adopting it. But it is precisely this distinction that Ricci
emphasizes.
Ricci's repeatedly expressed concern about whether an employer considers
the racial disparate impact of an exam before or after the employer announces
and administers the test identifies antibalkanization as the ground of the
Court's decision, rather than anticlassification or colorblindness. Passage after
passage of Ricci focuses on the City's decision to invalidate the test it had
already administered,"' frustrating the hopes and expectations of those who
took it. What seems to disturb Justice Kennedy is not the employer's
consideration of potential racial impact in the initial selection of employment
tests but the employer's decision to throw out an already-administered
promotion test, especially when that change in standards is justified for reasons
concerning the race of the candidates the test selected:
[O]nce that [promotions] process has been established and employers
have made clear their selection criteria, they may not then invalidate the
test results, thus upsetting an employee's legitimate expectation not to
be judged on the basis of race. Doing so, absent a strong basis in
evidence of an impermissible disparate impact, amounts to the sort of
racial preference that Congress has disclaimed, § 2000e-2(j), and is
antithetical to the notion of a workplace where individuals are
guaranteed equal opportunity regardless of race.'
On this understanding of Ricci, wrongful disparate treatment consists of an
employer's expressly race-related interaction with job applicants. By this
reading, Ricci rejects (1) New Haven's decision to change already-public
selection criteria on which applicants have relied in forming judgments about
isi. See supra text accompanying note 145; see also Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676 ("If an employer
cannot rescore a test based on the candidates' race, § 2000e-2(l), then it follows afortiori that
it may not take the greater step of discarding the test altogether to achieve a more desirable
racial distribution of promotion-eligible candidates -absent a strong basis in evidence that
the test was deficient and that discarding the results is necessary to avoid violating the
disparate-impact provision. Restricting an employer's ability to discard test results (and
thereby discriminate against qualified candidates on the basis of their race) also is in keeping
with Title VII's express protection of bona fide promotional examinations.").
IS2. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
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their employment prospects (2) for the publicly stated reason of avoiding racial
disparate impact where (3) there is not "a strong basis in evidence" supporting
the disparate impact claim. 3
D. Antibalkanization, Parents Involved, and Ricci
But what kinds of racial considerations are sufficiently provocative that
federal courts are prepared to step in to constrain them? In Parents Involved,
Justice Kennedy sanctioned the government's pursuit of diversity through the
race-conscious choice offacially neutral policies - but balked at the government's
pursuit of diversity through race-conscious decisions about individuals,
arguing that this use of racial classifications would violate individual dignity
and promote racial balkanization.' Has Justice Kennedy drawn this same line
in Ricci? Ricci involved race-conscious government action but did not involve a
racial classification in the sense Justice Kennedy discussed in Parents Involved.
At no point did New Haven single out individual applicants for promotion and
give their applications a plus on the basis of racial identity as the schools
treated applicants for admission in Parents Involved; rather, on learning the
demographic composition of the group of test-takers who fared well and the
group that did not, New Haven threw out the test results for all applicants,
without ever knowing the scores of individual applicants, and with the plan to
153. The Ricci Court adopts a "strong-basis-in-evidence" standard from its affirmative action
cases as a constraint on compliance efforts that involve "intentional discrimination":
We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional
discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an
unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence
to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-
conscious, discriminatory action.
Id. The "intentional discrimination" that Justice Kennedy discusses in Ricci concerns the
treatment of those who studied for a test that was subsequently invalidated for reasons
related to the race of those the test made eligible for promotion. See, e.g., supra text
accompanying note 152 (referring to this action as a "preference").
In Parents Involved, the Court discusses the role of the "strong-basis-in-evidence"
standard in the Court's remedial affirmative action cases. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 754 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[F]or a
government unit to remedy past discrimination for which it was responsible, the Court has
required it to demonstrate 'a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action
was necessary.' Establishing a 'strong basis in evidence' requires proper findings regarding
the extent of the government unit's past racial discrimination." (citation omitted) (quoting
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
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administer a new test for all applicants. In that sense, Justice Kennedy imposed
a more stringent constraint on New Haven under Title VII than he seemed
willing to impose on school districts under the Constitution.
But in another sense, there is a river of common concern linking Justice
Kennedy's opinions in the two cases. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy
emphasizes that government has the responsibility and prerogative to promote
an equal opportunity society less afflicted by racial stratification, so long as the
government does so in ways that respect individual dignity and do not inflame
racial balkanization. In Ricci, Justice Kennedy seems equally concerned that
government abate racial stratification in ways that respect individual dignity
and do not inflame racial balkanization. The selection process that New Haven
employed - administering a promotion exam, then announcing that it would
retest the group because of the demographic composition of those who passed
and failed-did not give individual applicants a race-related advantage over
other individual applicants, but it did communicate to a relatively small group
of applicant coworkers that the City had race-related reasons for selecting the
test by which it would determine promotions and that it intended to change
tests in such a way that fewer of the white applicants would be promoted -a
message that invited all white applicants (who did not know their scores) to
imagine they would be promoted but for race.
Justice Kennedy defines the wrong in balkanization-focused terms:
Examinations like those administered by the City create legitimate
expectations on the part of those who took the tests. As is the case with
any promotion exam, some of the firefighters here invested substantial
time, money, and personal commitment in preparing for the tests.
Employment tests can be an important part of a neutral selection system that
safeguards against the very racial animosities Title VII was intended to
prevent. Here, however, the firefighters saw their efforts invalidated by
the City in sole reliance upon race-based statistics."ss
In this passage, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Ricci explains the
importance of protecting the "legitimate expectations" of those who take
employment tests as key in safeguarding against balkanization- "the very racial
animosities Title VII was intended to prevent." But what kind of "legitimate
expectations" is Justice Kennedy interpreting the disparate treatment
provisions of Title VII to protect? The job applicants have no entitlement to the
jobs in question, despite all the time that they invested in studying-"personal
155. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676 (emphasis added).
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sacrifices" that the Court recounts in empathic detail.' 6 If New Haven decided
not to hire anyone for fiscal reasons relating to a downturn of the market, the
applicants would have no claim to a job, either in equitable estoppel or under
civil rights law.
The "legitimate expectation" that the Court steps forward to protect is
quite specifically a "legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of
race." But exactly how has that "legitimate expectation not to be judged on
the basis of race" been breached? As we have seen, no applicant was singled out
and treated differently from any other; all took the same test and together
would have to take any future test the City adopted. The City's race-conscious
effort to ensure ex ante that it complied with Title VII and chose an exam that
tested for job skills without racial bias was one that, before Ricci, any lawyer
would counsel that Title VII required -and that Justice Kennedy continues to
insist remains appropriate today."" Justice Kennedy is not objecting to the use
of individualized racial classifications of the kind that he rejected in Parents
Involved; instead, Justice Kennedy focuses on the potentially balkanizing effects
of the City's announced plan to retest all its applicants because of the racial
distribution of promotions that the first test yielded. On this view, the
"legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of race" concerns the
City's conduct in jettisoning the results of an exam for reasons openly
concerned with the racial distribution of applicants the test would select:
"Here, however, the firefighters saw their efforts invalidated by the City in sole
reliance upon race-based statistics.""' On this view, the Court has interpreted
Title VII to protect a job applicant's expectation that his or her application will
be judged free of visible racial considerations.160
From the vantage point of the antibalkanization principle, which is
concerned with the lived experience of social relations, appearances matter
centrally. Competing for promotion in a process in which racial considerations
156. See id. at 2667 ("Ricci stated that he had 'several learning disabilities,' including dyslexia;
that he had spent more than $i,ooo to purchase the materials and pay his neighbor to read
them on tape so he could 'give it [his] best shot'; and that he had studied '8 to 13 hours a
day to prepare' for the test." (alteration in original) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari
app. at 169a, 176a-77a, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (No. 07-1428))); see also id. at 2676, 2681
(discussing the time the firefighters invested in studying).
157. Id. at 2677.
158. Justice Kennedy repeatedly emphasizes that employers can endeavor to avoid the racial
disparate impact of selection devices before employing them to test applicants. See supra
notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
159. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.
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play a visible-and seemingly decisive-part undermines the confidence of job
applicants that they have a fair opportunity to compete and so can affect race
relations in the workplace and in society at large. To be sure, the aggrievement
white applicants experience differs significantly from the paradigmatic forms of
race discrimination that Title VII was enacted to combat."' This distinction is
decisive for many concerned with subordination;"' but those concerned with
balkanization fear that, however majority group aggrievement differs from
161. Racial segregation was -and is -a social system with symbolic and material dimensions.
The paradigmatic form of race discrimination that Title VII was enacted to combat inflicts
harm on minority employees because it reflects and reinforces inequalities that minorities
experience across social spheres. Compare this to civil rights interventions that limit
opportunities for majority group members: these race-related restrictions on opportunity
may provoke aggrievement precisely as they deviate from structures of racial privilege that
organize the workplace and other social spheres.
But if we analyze the aggrievement of whites with attention to class as well as race,
however, there may be points of intersection in the experience of "race discrimination" and
"reverse discrimination." In some cases, majority group members may resent civil rights
interventions as restrictions on opportunity imposed by economically privileged whites on
less privileged whites; in this case, their sense of injury would have a social-structural logic
to it that resembles, at least in some degree, forms of race discrimination that racial
minorities experience.
162. The antisubordination framework judges the constitutionality of race-based state action by
asking whether it disrupts or entrenches historic forms of inequality. Proponents of
antisubordination would have judges closely review race-based practices that entrench
historic inequalities and have judges defer to race-based practices that disrupt historic
inequalities. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. That said, a number of judges and
commentators prominently associated with the antisubordination perspective advocate at
least "intermediate" judicial scrutiny of "benign" or integration-promoting race-based state
action-a form of review providing more oversight than rationality review, yet more
deference than strict scrutiny, which those associated with the antisubordination perspective
would reserve for race-based state action that entrenches historic forms of inequality. See,
e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) ("We hold that benign race-
conscious measures mandated by Congress -even if those measures are not 'remedial' in the
sense of being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal
discrimination- are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A] number of considerations -developed in
gender-discrimination cases but which carry even more force when applied to racial
classifications -lead us to conclude that racial classifications designed to further remedial
purposes 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives."' (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Frank I. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race
and Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United States and South Africa, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1378 (2004).
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minority group aggrievement, it nevertheless can stimulate racial resentments
that erode social cohesion.
On this understanding, proponents of antibalkanization might be
concerned with how a workplace policy appears to workers, without reasoning
from a formalist or "post-racial" standpoint that equates harms to members of
majority and minority groups"' or from an "unprincipled" concern with racial
appearances. 4 Reasoning from a concern about conditions that threaten
cohesion in a society negotiating a transition in racial mores, proponents of an
antibalkanization understanding of equality might adopt the perspective of
"transitional justice"'s and concern themselves with the social meaning of
163. See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1589 (2009) (analyzing "postracialism
as an ideology that both converges and departs from its predecessor 'colorblindness"' and
"identify[ing] four key features of the revamped ideology (racial progress or transcendence,
race neutral universalism, moral equivalence, and political distancing)"); Haney L6pez,
supra note 22, at 988 ("By reactionary colorblindness I mean an anticlassification
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that accords race-conscious remedies and
racial subjugation the same level of constitutional hostility."); Siegel, supra note 21, at 90-92
(discussing discourse of "formal race" employed in colorblindness claims that treats race as
an abstract property that subordinate and superordinate groups share).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 194-200 (discussing Primus's article on Ricci, cited supra
note 105).
165. Transitional justice addresses problems of justice and the rule of law that arise in the
aftermath of repressive political regimes, where the state and much of the social order is
understood to have engaged in massive wrongdoing. See, e.g., Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional
Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 69, 69 (2003) ("Transitional justice can be defined
as the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal
responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes."). The repertoire
of transitional justice strategies generally includes institutions and practices, such as trials
and truth commissions, for confronting past wrongdoing. Cf id. at 86-87 ("In the
transitional justice discourse, revisiting the past is understood as the way to move forward.
... The paradoxical goal in transition is to undo history. The aim is to reconceive the social
meaning of past conflicts, particularly defeats, in an attempt to reconstruct their present and
future effects."). But these strategies have been developed with attention to the need to
develop social cohesion in communities that have been riven by violence. Id. at 79-80 ("Seen
in a genealogical perspective, the primary aim of truth commissions was not justice but
peace.... [This] response transcended the single-minded focus on individual accountability
in favor of a more communitarian conception.").
Civil rights laws might be conceived of as a practice of transitional justice. So
understood, race moderates' instinct to organize civil rights interventions so as to minimize
public attention to their remedial aims can easily be criticized as lacking transparency and
undermining the aims of transitional justice by masking past wrongdoing.
But race moderates' instinct to allow civil rights interventions on the condition that
they assume universalizing form might be differently understood: as a practice of
transitional justice that facilitates movement away from a world forged in racial wrongdoing
and toward a new world in which participants might see, understand, and "live" race
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practices in the hopes of channeling old understandings of race into new and
transformative forms.16 6 Justice Kennedy's opinion in Ricci judges an
employer's inquiry into the racial disparate impact of an employment test
differently, depending on whether the inquiry occurs before or after the
employer has announced and administered the test. The distinction that the
Ricci opinion draws does not reflect race-formalism and need not reflect an
unprincipled consideration of appearances. It might well reflect a context-
attentive judgment about the different understanding of race produced by
employer practices that attend to the racial disparate impact of employment
tests before they are announced and administered -and after. Kennedy's own
discussion suggests as much.16 7
Analyzed from this standpoint, the antibalkanization principle itself
provides compelling reason for New Haven to inquire into the racial disparate
impact of its promotion tests. The antibalkanization principle raises concern
about features of the City's selection process that have the potential to estrange
minority as well as majority groups in the community. Disparate impact law
guards against employment practices that have the potential to divide and
balkanize employees along racial lines. Much as proponents of
antibalkanization have conditionally approved affirmative action to promote
social cohesion, so, too, can they endorse disparate impact law as a tool to
ensure that all members of the community have confidence that the employer
* 68is hiring and promoting on an equal-opportunity basis.
differently. On this view, race moderates' concern with the social form of civil rights
interventions can be understood as a concern with cultivating cohesion in a period of regime
transition. As such, it shares at least some functional similarity with other transitional justice
strategies that endeavor to promote peace and forge bonds of community that support the
growth of a new sociopolitical order.
166. Some race progressives have theorized this approach to the disestablishment of entrenched
status relations. See infra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing the work of Nancy
Fraser).
167. Compare Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2676 (2009) ("Employment tests can be an
important part of a neutral selection system that safeguards against the very racial
animosities Title VII was intended to prevent. Here, however, the firefighters saw their
efforts invalidated by the City in sole reliance upon race-based statistics."), with id. at 2677
("Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a test or
practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all
individuals, regardless of their race. And when, during the test-design stage, an employer
invites comments to ensure the test is fair, that process can provide a common ground for
open discussions toward that end.").
168. See supra text accompanying note 15o.
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E. The Antibalkanization Principle as the Basis for Disparate Impact Law
The intense controversy surrounding New Haven's decision to retest
applicants dominates discussions of Ricci. But as Justice Ginsburg's dissent
emphasizes, the City's concern about adopting a test that would substantially
preclude the promotion of minority applicants arose against the backdrop of a
long-running conflict over the employment practices of the Fire Department.
Because of this conflict, it was not only white applicants who mistrusted the
Department's personnel decisions but minority applicants, as well. For
decades, minority firefighters had struggled to gain access to a department that
they viewed as hostile to their presence.
In the early 1970s, African-Americans and Hispanics composed 30% of
New Haven, yet only 3.6% of the fire department.'"e In 1973, at a time of
widespread challenges to race discrimination in municipal employment,o7 the
Firebird Society of New Haven, an association of minority firefighters,
challenged the employment practices of the New Haven Fire Department as
racially discriminatory.'7 ' The suit ended with a consent decree requiring the
City to adopt recruitment, hiring, and promotion practices designed to remedy
past discrimination, ensure against future discrimination, and help increase
diversity in the department. 7
After implementation of the decree and decades of continuing litigation,
racial disparities among entry-level firefighters have significantly decreased.
While the population of New Haven is nearly 40% African-American and over
20% Hispanic, 30% of the City's firefighters are black, and 16% are Hispanic."17
But there remains substantial underrepresentation in the Department's officer
corps: only 9% of senior officers are African-American, and a similar
169. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 2690-91 (describing a report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights that
found "'pervasive"' race discrimination in municipal employment, due both to "overt
racism" as well as reliance "'on criteria unrelated to job performance,"' such as "nepotism or
political patronage." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 17 (1971); 118 CONG. REC. 1817
(1972))).
171. See Firebird Soc'y of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 66 F.R.D. 457
(D. Conn. 1975).
172. See id. at 462.
173. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). According to the 2000 Census, 37.4% of
New Haven residents arc African-American, and 21.4% are Latino. See supra note 139.
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percentage are Hispanic."' Only one of twenty-one New Haven fire captains is
black."'
In the years since the consent decree first brought significant numbers of
nonwhite firefighters into the New Haven Fire Department, the Department's
employment practices remain a site of conflict and mistrust. The Firebirds, and
their members, have brought several lawsuits challenging the City's
practices.",6 The firefighters union-which, mirroring the Department it
represents, is predominantly white-has repeatedly sided against minority
firefighters (who are also, of course, members of the union), even intervening
174. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2691.
175- Id.
176. In 1992, for example, the Firebird Society sued to enjoin the City's practice of "stockpiling,"
in which it would hire or promote a number of people just as the employment lists were
about to expire for jobs that were not yet vacant. This practice, the Firebirds argued,
violated the City's civil service rules, which permitted employees to be hired only for current
vacancies. Most of the people who were "stockpiled" were white. The firefighters union
intervened in the suit on the side of the City to defend this practice. The Firebirds won. New
Haven Firebird Soc'y v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 630 A.2d 131 (Conn. App. Ct.), appeal denied,
634 A.2d 295 (Conn. 1993). In 2004, the Firebirds challenged the City's practice of
"underfilling" -that is, leaving vacancies at the captain level and using the money to hire
more than the allotted number of subordinate officers (lieutenants). This violated the civil
service rules and, the Firebirds alleged, resulted in the promotion of fewer minorities to
captain when such promotions did occur because there were more lieutenants against whom
to compete. Again the union intervened to defend the practice, and again the Firebirds won.
Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 851 A.2d 1113 (Conn. 2004); see also Nicole Allan & Emily
Bazelon, The Ladder, SLATE (June 25, 2009, 7:17 AM),
http://www.slate.com/id/222125o/entry/2221298 (describing the history of successful
antidiscrimination lawsuits against the New Haven Fire Department).
In 1998, a New Haven firefighter who criticized the department's hiring practices as
discriminatory on a television talk show was suspended from work shortly thereafter.
Benson v. Daniels, 89 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214-15 (D. Conn. 2000). The firefighter, then
president of the Firebirds, sued the City, claiming his suspension was in retaliation for his
criticism and therefore unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id. The lawsuit was
eventually settled. See Order of Dismissal of Case Due to Reported Settlement, Benson v.
Daniels, 98-CV-1290 (D. Conn. Apr. 13, 2000).
In 2002, two firefighters, active-and outspoken-in the Firebirds, were fired,
ostensibly for copying a personnel list to which they were not supposed to have access.
However, both terminations were overturned by the state labor board and eventually by
Connecticut state courts. See Brantley v. City of New Haven, 920 A.2d 331 (Conn. App. Ct.
2007); William Kaempffer, Appeals Court Rules Firefighter Be Rehired, NEw HAVEN REG.,
May 4, 2007, at A3; William Kaempffer, Appeals Court Rules for Firefighter, NEw HAVEN
REG., July 23, 2005, at Ai. The firings were understood, and protested, as retaliation for the
firefighters' criticism of the Department's discriminatory hiring practices and the
firefighters' participation in litigation to contest these practices. See, e.g., Meg Barone, Black
Pickets Support New Haven Firefighters, CONN. POST, Apr. 12, 2002, at A6.
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in lawsuits to which it was not originally a party in order to defend the
employment practices contested by the Firebirds as racially discriminatory.177
These ongoing tensions between minority firefighters, on the one hand,
and the union and Fire Department, on the other, framed the controversy in
Ricci. Selection of the promotion standard did not occur outside the conflict
but was instead entangled in it.78 In 2004, when the City first announced that
the test had identified a group of firefighters for promotion that included no
African-Americans, the New Haven Register opened its report by describing the
"palpable" "tension" in the air, in terms that foretold the conflict that would
follow. 179
The New Haven Civil Service Board hearings that ensued document how
tests that shut out minority applicants without clear public justification can
balkanize, especially in a workplace with a history such as the Department's.
When the City announced that exam results indicated that virtually no
minority candidates would be promoted, minority firefighters attributed the
outcome to an inequitable testing process that tested for insider information,
possessed by white applicants who had a long history of firefighters in the
177. See Firebird Soc'y ofNew Haven, 66 F.R.D. at 460 (explaining the union's support for white
Fire Department captains who opposed restructuring promotions to permit the entry of
more firefighters of color); New Haven Firebird Soc'y, 630 A.2d 131 (noting that the union
not only intervened to defend an employment practice challenged by the Firebirds as racially
discriminatory and prohibited by the civil service rules but also was the only party to appeal
the Court's decision when the Court ruled in favor of the Firebirds); see also New Haven
Firefighters Local 825 V. City of New Haven, No. 3:04cv169, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38139,
at *7 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2005) (describing the firefighters union's attempt to sue the City
for refusing to certify the results of the exams at issue in Ricci and holding that the union
did not satisfy the standing requirements for organizational plaintiffs, because the "deep and
divisive conflict between the interests of its members" was "clear").
178. It was by contract with the firefighters union that the City weighed the written and oral
components of the promotion exam in a 60/4o ratio -a requirement that increased the racial
disparate impact of the test results. Testimony before the Civil Service Board indicated that
had the scores been weighted differently, so that the oral score accounted for 70% and the
written 30%, two additional African-American lieutenant candidates and one additional
black candidate for captain could have been considered for promotion. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at
2679; see also Complaint, Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 04-CV-01109 (D. Conn. Oct. 15,
2009) (challenging the City's weighting of the employment test at issue in Ricci as not job-
related).
179. William Kaempffer, Fire Exams Flawed, Lawyer Says, NEW HAVEN REG., Jan. 23, 2004, at A3,
available at www.nhregister.con/articles/2004/ol/23/import/lo855oo4.txt ("The three police
officers stationed at the meeting were a strong indication that city officials expected some
tension. And tension there was. It was palpable . . . .").
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family as minority applicants did not.so At the hearings, minority firefighters
worried about how young persons of color in the community would find role
models if the Fire Department was predominantly led by whites"' and spoke of
the sense of racial estrangement that hearing the exam results provoked. One
firefighter stated:
[W]hen you see 99 percent of minority firefighters-we're first-
generation firefighters. You know, a lot of my Caucasian counterparts,
they've come into the fire houses when they were little kids. They've
come into the fire - they've seen different study material. They went to
all the New York fire houses in which all this material is coming. They
met John Norman. They've met Randy. And they've been to their
seminars.
This-if you look at the results, something's wrong. If 70 percent of
your officers are white, something's wrong....
And if you do this again in another three or four years where you
only promote seven or eight officers and you pit 44 Caucasians against
15 or 18 blacks and change the rules again -now, I've got these pile of
books. I've been reading them. Ever since the test was over, I've read
them. I've been reading them over and over and over. Now come the
next exam, the rules are going to be changed again. That's what I'm
anticipating. 8 ,
Another testified:
You're going to tell me this kid, this sharp boy that studied, does what
he's supposed to do, comes to work, does his job, who is going home
about the test and everything, that he failed this test? This kid is bright
i8o. See In re: Fire Captain and Lieutenant Promotional Exams, Hearings Before the City of New
Haven Civil Serv. Comm'n 65-66 (New Haven, Conn. Feb. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Promotional
Exams Hearings] (statement of Lieutenant Gary Tinney, New Haven firefighter) (" [T]he
people that have these books are uncles, nephews, kids from people that have been in the
Fire Department for years. Personally, I never had these books. I never had anyone that was
a grandfather or uncle or anybody. I grew up in the city of New Haven. I've been in New
Haven all my life. And these books have been read and known for a long time before this
test came out.").
181. See, e.g., id. at 38-40 (statement of Donald Day, Rep. of the Northeast Region of the
International Association of Black Professional Firefighters) ("One other thing I'd like to say
is that young black and Latino kids have every right to see black and Latino officers on those
fire trucks that are riding through their community. They have every right to look for a role
model on that fire truck. They have every right to expect to see that.").
182. Id. at 92-93 (statement of Octavius Dawson, New Haven firefighter).
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and sharp. There's no way. And I got to sit here and see him with his
head down because he hears that he didn't pass the test. That's a slap in
the face. It's not fair. And like, again, there's enough divisiveness
among this department. I thought we were supposed to be comrades
and we were together. That's what firefighting is supposed to be all
about. But it's not. These guys think there's so much diversity on this
department.
... And things - the way things are going now hurts. ... And this
test showing that no minorities passed-
It's not going to work. ... It's going to cause a big ruckus. And it
doesn't make sense. We're supposed to be together. We're supposed to
work together. We're supposed to save lives. And that's supposed to be
the most important thing. And it's not.S3
The vivid testimony of minority firefighters reminds us that the disparate
impact framework itself is designed to inhibit the estrangement and build the
confidence of minority applicants in the job market as a job market in which
minority as well as majority applicants have an equal opportunity.184 That
cohesion-building function remains important for minority communities
today, as Justice O'Connor observed in upholding race-based affirmative action
under an equal protection strict scrutiny framework:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the
openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this
training. As we have recognized, law schools "cannot be effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law
interacts."""s
In this case, with dispute about the fairness of the test raging, both the
majority-white firefighters union as well as the black firefighters urged the City
to validate the promotion exam in accordance with the EEOC's guidelines on
disparate impact, seeking in a definitive determination of the test's job
183. Id. at 79-80 (Jan. 22, 2004) (statement of Lieutenant Gary Kinney, New Haven firefighter).
184. See infra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing the role of work in shaping forms of
community).
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relevance a ground on which to settle the dispute about the validity of the test
results.186 But the City decided to discard the test, without ever receiving a
report indicating whether the test accurately measured skills needed for the job,
thus leaving to public debate a question central to the fairness of its
procedures.' Without any such report, the parties had little more to draw on
besides the recollection of a representative of the test preparer (IOS) and
anecdotal reports of test-takers. It is unsurprising that from these accounts, the
parties - and the public - drew vastly different conclusions about the exam.
186. See, e.g., Promotional Exams Hearings, supra note 180, at 11-12 (Feb. 5, 2004) (statement of
Patrick Egan, President of New Haven Firefighters Local 82 5 ) ("[T]he answer to find out
the fairness of the exam is clearly spoken about in that federal code. It talks about business
necessity and certain validation procedures to be able to look at and evaluate if, in its
totality, the exam was fair. So what we as a membership would ask for is that, since the
issue-the City has brought up the issue of disparate impact, that then the law be, you
know, followed through, that there be a validation study done on the exam, content-based,
that it be done by a third-party professional who has the expertise, credibility and resources
to perform such a study .... ); id. at 41-42 (statement of Ronald Mackey, Internal Affairs
Officer for the Northeast Region of the International Association of Black Professional
Firefighters) (agreeing with Egan that "the Federal Guidelines" ought to be followed and
indicating that a validation study ought to be performed); id. at 55 (statement of
Alderwoman Shirley Ellis-West) ("I am hearing that this Commission is very strongly
considering looking at validating and the reliability of this test through a third party or
however. I'm very, very happy to hear that this Commission is looking to do that because I
think that's going to be important in how we resolve this issue.").
187. In order for an employment exam to be validated properly under the EEOC Guidelines, the
results of a validation study must be documented. See EEOC, UNIFORM GUIDELINES ON
EMPLOYEE SELECTION PROCEDURES § 15(C) (1978). This report must include detailed
descriptions of the job analysis undertaken in developing the test and the selection
procedures represented in the exam; evidence demonstrating that the selection procedures
were job-related, including an explanation of the job qualification each test item was meant
to measure; an explanation of the alternative selection procedures that were considered and
their likely impact; and the rationale for choosing any cutoff score, ranking, or weighting
used. See id. The EEOC emphasizes that informal reports of the exam's validity, such as
those the Civil Service Commission heard in the hearings, are insufficient. See id. § 9(A)
("Under no circumstances will . . . casual reports of its validity be accepted in lieu of
evidence of validity. Specifically ruled out are . . . non-empirical or anecdotal accounts of
selection practices or selection outcomes.").
Although the parties in Ricci disagreed about the extent to which the content of the
exam was job-related, it is undisputed that neither IOS nor the City itself produced an
empirical report of the kind contemplated by the EEOC Guidelines. See Petitioners' Brief on
the Merits at 35, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428, o8-328)
(explaining that the City never received any written report documenting the exam's
validity); Respondents' Brief on the Merits at 11, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428, o8-
328) (same).
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They disagreed about whether the exam was job-related,'" about whether it
was scored fairly,'"' and about the City's motives for failing to obtain
documentation of a validation study.'90 Indeed, perhaps the only thing upon
which those who testified at the City's hearings seemed to agree is that the City
ought to provide a validation report.19" Both sides sought a procedure for
assuring that Fire Department promotions would be determined on the basis
of job qualifications, not race.
In short, as the Ricci record shows, invalidating test scores for openly racial
reasons can estrange majority applicants, while promoting employees on the
basis of tests that are of uncertain job-relevance but have dramatic racial
disparate impact can estrange minority applicants. In Ricci, Justice Kennedy
recognized that confidence of majority and minority employees in the selection
processes that allocate employment opportunities is crucial in shaping race
relations in the workplace, pointing out that, properly administered, the
disparate impact framework can promote "a common ground for open
discussions" about what different employees might view as a fair test and
emphasizing that fair tests are "safeguards against the very racial animosities
188. Compare Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 187, at 20 ("[R]espondents knew their
tests were content-valid."), id. at 7 ("lOS composed and validated the exams based on
EEOC-recommended practices."), and id. at 7 n.3, with Respondents' Brief on the Merits,
supra note 187, at 29 n.19 ("The sole person to review the tests was a fire officer from outside
Atlanta. Not only is the relevance of this review questionable, but standard practice requires
review of an exam by multiple experts. Legel later testified that internal review was
'[s]tandard practice."' (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting petitioners'
appendix)).
189. Compare Petitioners' Reply Brief on the Merits at 26-27, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428,
08-328) (explaining that "there is no merit to respondents' criticism" of the use of 7o as the
cutoff score as required by the New Haven City Charter), with Respondents' Brief on the
Merits, supra note 187, at 3 ("IOS did not, however, pursue a process ... which enables a
test-developer to 'establish a content-valid, legally defensible cut-off score for the
examination.' . . . IOS conceded that using the 'conventional cutoff of 70 'isn't very
meaningful when you are trying to find . . . the cut-off score that defines minimally
competent or minimally qualified, which is ultimately what you are looking to do in a
situation like this."' (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting petitioners'
appendix).
19o. Compare Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 187, at 35 (arguing that the City refused
to receive an 10S report that would have validated the exam, because it wished to remain
"willfully ignorant of [the] test's validity" in order to justify throwing it out), with
Respondents' Brief on the Merits, supra note 187, at ii (arguing that "there is no evidence
that the City attempted to prevent IOS from preparing a technical report" and that the
report 10S initially contracted to provide "would not have proved whether the tests were in
fact 'valid"' anyway).
191. See supra note 186.
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Title VII was intended to prevent.""9 2 The facts of Ricci illustrate that, when
properly implemented, the disparate impact framework serves to deter
balkanization and so promote social cohesion, in much the fashion that the
race-conscious design of percent plans and school district boundaries can.
The text of the Ricci decision and the concern with racial balkanization that
has guided the center of the Court for several decades now (1) point to
retesting for overtly racial reasons as the locus of liability in Ricci and (2)
identify reasons for preserving the disparate impact framework itself in order
to promote workplace cohesion. Ricci is written in the tradition of Bakke,
Croson, Grutter, and Parents Involved. In each of these decisions, race moderates
preserved, while limiting, civil rights interventions that their conservative
brethren would have barred.'9 Race progressives have often condemned the
decisions of race conservatives and moderates together without identifying the
ways in which they diverge in result or rationale. But, as this Article shows,
there are principled differences between race moderates and race conservatives
that have played a significant role in shaping our law.
How we understand the past in turn shapes the way we imagine the future
of equal protection law. In an important early commentary on Ricci, Richard
Primus identifies three possible readings of the case": a "general" reading that
calls into question the constitutionality of all disparate impact law as race-
conscious government action in violation of equal protection;19 s an
"institutional" reading that suggests that government employers are not
competent to enforce disparate impact remedies because they are vulnerable to
192. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676; id. at 2677 ("Title VII does not prohibit an employer from
considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that test or practice in
order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race. And when,
during the test-design stage, an employer invites comments to ensure the test is fair, that
process can provide a common ground for open discussions toward that end.").
193. See supra text accompanying note 61.
194. Primus, supra note 1o5, at 1344-45.
195. Id. at 1363 ("The relevant perspective here takes colorblindness, understood as the rejection
of race-conscious governmental action, as the guiding value of equal protection."); see also
id. (observing that "the general reading would represent a fundamental change in American
antidiscrimination law"). Primus explains the basis of his reading: "Disparate impact
doctrine is race conscious; equal protection requires racial neutrality; the two are not
compatible." Id. at 1344. The reading seems to be premised on the view that race-conscious
action violates equal protection, although it does not identify a standard for demonstrating
discriminatory purpose.
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capture (in the past by white ethnic groups and now by racial minorities); and
a "visible-victims" reading holding that "equal protection limits disparate
impact remedies to those that do not disadvantage determinate and innocent
third parties"'9 6-a constraint that "[m]any people to both the left and the
right of the Supreme Court may consider . .. unprincipled""' but nonetheless
represents a familiar way of managing the "public social meaning" of the
"damage" on whites that disparate impact law inflicts."' If the Court adopts a
colorblindness reading and applies strict scrutiny to disparate impact law,
Primus warns, disparate impact law is likely to survive compelling interest
analysis only as a tool for smoking out hidden intentional discrimination rather
than as a remedy for structural discrimination.'"
Exploring all three possible readings of Ricci, Primus offers no clear view
about which the Court will endorse: "the Ricci premise is, as of now,
indeterminate," with "the choice among its possible readings . . . significantly
driven by the facts of the case that presents the constitutional question."2 oo
Temporizing, Primus suggests that the Court may adopt the institutional or
visible-victims reading of Ricci. But the framework of the Primus analysis
suggests that colorblindness will reach beyond objections to racial
classifications and draw into question the constitutionality of race-conscious,
facially neutral state action, over time, steadily gaining ground on the race-
asymmetric understandings of the antisubordination principle. On this view, it
196. Id. at 1374.
197. Id. at 1345.
198. Id. at 1372.
199. Id. at 1376-78. Interestingly enough, Kenneth Marcus, who served as the director of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights under President George W. Bush, argues the constitutional
case against disparate impact law somewhat more narrowly than does Professor Primus.
Professor Marcus argues for evaluating disparate impact law under a "predominant racial
motive" standard and contends that where disparate impact law redresses intentional or
unconscious discrimination, racial motivation does not predominate, but where disparate
impact law redresses structural discrimination, racial motivation predominates in violation
of equal protection. See supra note 144.
In contrast to Professors Primus and Marcus, Justice Scalia seems to suggest that
disparate impact law taken as a whole is unconstitutional, as reflecting a discriminatory
purpose within the meaning of Feeney. See supra note 143 (discussing Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion in Ricci); cf Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)
("'[D]iscriminatory purpose,' however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature,
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted)).
2oo. Primus, supra note los, at 1382.
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is only a matter of time until the forty-year-old disparate impact framework is
invalidated by the immanent logic of colorblindness. 201
But if we recognize the antibalkanization perspective that has given
defining shape to modern equal protection law, our intuitions about the law's
developmental trajectory may change. At a minimum, recognizing
antibalkanization alters the frame in which we read Ricci. The triadic
framework through which this Article analyzes debates over equal protection
identifies the reading of Ricci that makes the best sense of the text of the
decision, on its own terms and as part of our recent constitutional history:
(1) the antibalkanization perspective illuminates passage after passage of Ricci
concerned with the racial resentment that changing an already-administered
promotion test stimulated; (2) antibalkanization explains the opinion's focus
on retesting (the so-called visible-victims reading) as a potentially principledo 2
ground of decision in Ricci, a concern with threats to social cohesion that
Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Kennedy have invoked as reason to preserve
and to limit civil rights initiatives in the past; and (3) antibalkanization
supplies reasons to preserve disparate impact law that are grounded in the
same concerns of cohesion that justify restrictions on retesting: the importance
of sustaining the confidence of (minority and majority) employees in the
fairness of the selection processes.
In short, antibalkanization provides race moderates reasons to uphold as
well as to limit disparate impact law, just as it provides race moderates reasons
to uphold as well as to limit affirmative action law. Antibalkanization in fact
supplies new justifications for disparate impact law. Just as moderates and
progressives tend to uphold affirmative action for distinctive reasons, with
moderates concerned about social cohesion and progressives concerned about
repair of unequal group status, so, too, moderates might conclude that
concerns about social cohesion warrant preserving disparate impact law, in
201. The Primus analysis does not focus on the doctrines mandating different treatment of race-
based and facially neutral state action that initially cabined the reach of conservative
arguments about colorblindness, cf supra notes 96-1o6 and accompanying text, so it does
not clarify the doctrinal path the Court would take, its practical implications for other laws,
or its conceptual implications for colorblindness. Even conservative proponents of
colorblindness, who are divided and confused about the constitutional status of race-
conscious, facially neutral laws, see supra notes 96-1o6 and accompanying text, may reflect
differently on the doctrinal shape and normative content of the colorblindness principle they
wish to embrace. Would they subject all civil rights laws to strict scrutiny? Only civil rights
laws?
zoz. Contra supra text accompanying note 197 (discussing those who consider attention to the
form of race-conscious interventions "unprincipled").
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addition to traditional concerns about repairing hidden, unconscious, and
structural bias.
Forms of community forged at work, as at school, can divide or unite us.2 o3
When employers hire and promote on the basis of criteria that have an
unjustified racial disparate impact (because employers have hidden or
unconscious biases or are selecting for traits associated with current jobholders
rather than for the skills needed to do the job), they are not only perpetuating
group inequality but also exacerbating balkanization in the workplace. The
disparate impact framework provides incentives for employers to ensure that
the employment criteria used select among applicants in race-salient ways-
only insofar as needed to do the job in question. A workplace organized in this
way is more likely to be and to be seen as open to all applicants. Thus, as the
disparate impact framework ameliorates unjust social stratification, it also can
alleviate balkanization-the rationale that Justice O'Connor offered for
affirmative action.2 o4
Indeed, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved suggests that race
moderates might have reason to prefer that governments pursue integration by
the elimination of criteria with unjustified disparate impact rather than by
affirmative action. Avoiding selection criteria that have unjustified racial
disparate impact produces institutions that integrate in the normal course of
business, without "affirmative" action. Demographic awareness at the stage of
institutional design may disrupt racial legacies of the past and allow new forms
of race relations to develop without requiring participants to engage in specific
race-conscious interactions-or so Justice Kennedy's opinions in Parents
Involved and Ricci suggest.20s
203. See Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. i881, 1886-92 (2000) (arguing that work
is capable of transforming workers' identities, building community, and providing the basis
for equal citizenship); see also CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE
BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 4 (2003) (arguing that the workplace is,
"generally speaking, both more sociable and cooperative and more integrated than most
places where adults spend time" and thus that the workplace is "extraordinarily important in
a diverse democratic society").
204. See supra text accompanying note 63 (quoting Justice O'Connor's discussion of affirmative
action in Grutter).
205. See supra text accompanying note 107 (discussing the preference for integration through
districting in Parents Involved); supra text accompanying note 167 (discussing the Ricci
Court's preference for consideration of disparate impact of promotion criteria in the
selection of a test before it is administered); see also infra note 235 (discussing Nancy Fraser's
distinction between affirmative and transformative remedies).
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IV.TOWARD "A MORE PERFECT UNION"
[S]o many of the disparities that exist in the African-American community
today can be directly traced to inequalities passed on from an earlier
generation that suffered under the brutal legacy ofslavery and Jim Crow.
... Even for those blacks who did make it, questions of race, and racism,
continue to define their worldview in fundamental ways.
In fact, a similar anger exists within segments of the white community.
Most working- and middle-class white Americans don't feel that they have
been particularly privileged by their race. Their experience is the immigrant
experience -as far as they're concerned, no one's handed them anything,
they've built it from scratch.... [I]n an era of stagnant wages and global
competition, opportunity comes to be seen as a zero sum game, in which your
dreams come at my expense. So when they are told to bus their children to a
school across town; when they hear that an African American is getting an
advantage in landing a good job or a spot in a good college because of an
injustice that they themselves never committed; when they're told that their
fears about crime in urban neighborhoods are somehow prejudiced,
resentment builds over time.
Like the anger within the black community, these resentments aren't
always expressed in polite company. But they have helped shape the political
landscape for at least a generation.
-Barack Obama, "A More Perfect Union," Philadelphia,
March 18, 2008206
At a crucial juncture in his campaign for the presidency, Senator Barack
Obama spoke of racial justice in terms that bridged a divided nation. He
invoked an image of constitutional community:
[A] firm conviction -a conviction rooted in my faith in God and my
faith in the American people-that working together we can move
beyond some of our old racial wounds, and that in fact we have no
choice if we are to continue on the path of a more perfect union."o7
206. Senator Barack Obama, A More Perfect Union: Address at the National Constitution Center
(Mar. 18, 2008), in THE SPEECH: RACE AND BARACK OBAMA'S "A MORE PERFECT UNION" 243
(T. Denean Sharpley-Whitins ed., 2009).
207. Id.
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Without equating the anger and mistrust of whites and blacks, Senator Obama
recognized and related them. Without equating the position of whites and
blacks, he demonstrated how addressing the vulnerabilities of white Americans
was an integral part of transforming the position of black Americans. The
Philadelphia speech modeled a conversation about racial justice in a
community riven by racial strife - a conversation in politics, with no imminent
prospect of settlement, only the pragmatic needs of coexistence, shaped to an
uncertain degree by the constitutional conviction that we are, and are
committed to be, joined in a more perfect union.
As an African-American Democratic nominee for president, Senator Obama
invoked this vision with different authority and very different understandings
from those of the Justices on the Court who reason from antibalkanization
concerns. But his observations nonetheless seem responsive to similar
developments - to the race conflicts of the civil rights era. We are not "post-
racial," as fierce racial divisions about the Obama presidency make painfully
clear.2' Responding to the race conflicts of the civil rights era, moderates in
dialogue with a polarized Court and nation have articulated the view that social
cohesion is a prerequisite for equality. 09 The emergence of this reflexive
understanding on the Court reveals that positions in the debate over equality
are dynamic and responsive, shifting, however slowly, over the decades.2"o As
Americans have argued with one another about the best way to "get beyond"
the legacy of slavery and segregation, they have elected presidents who have
appointed Justices who have invoked concerns of anticlassification,
antisubordination, and, increasingly, antibalkanization.2 '
208. For example, one poll found that 91% of black respondents but only 37% of white
respondents said they "[a]pprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as
president." Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Obama's 'Race' War, N.Y. TIMEs, July 31, 2010, at
Ai 9 . The poll demonstrated similarly striking racial differences of opinion on more specific
aspects of Obama's presidency, such as his handling of the economy, foreign policy, and
immigration. See id.
209. Antibalkanization's emergence suggests that the long-running conflict over equality's
meaning has had constructive consequence. Cf Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
1323, 1331 (2006) ("Bitter constitutional dispute can be hermeneutically constructive, and
has little noticed socially integrative effects.").
21o. It is not only that the composition of the Court changed; the views of Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy seem to have changed with changes in the composition of the Court. Cf
Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV.
104, 105 (2007) (exploring LULAC and Parents Involved as decisions "run[ning] directly
contrary to Justice Kennedy's prior equal protection jurisprudence").
211. For historical accounts of the emergence of antisubordination and anticlassification values,
see Schmidt, supra note 25; and Siegel, supra note 7.
1350
120:1278 2011
FROM COLORBLINDNESS TO ANTIBALKANIZATION
To this point, the project of this Article has been to describe the arguments
of the "swing" Justices as they diverge from the colorblindness commitments
espoused by conservative critics of affirmative action. In describing the
antibalkanization perspective, I have synthesized concerns animating decisions
authored by several Justices over several decades. In concluding, I raise
questions about the antibalkanization perspective whose emergence I have
been chronicling.
My aim in this Part is to suggest how recognizing antibalkanization as a
perspective that differs from anticlassification and antisubordination makes
possible debate about what it means to vindicate concerns about cohesion in a
plausible and principled way -a conversation in which even those who do not
believe that concerns about social cohesion are a proper basis for interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause can nonetheless enter into dialogue with those
who do.
By analyzing the normative and practical judgments guiding the
enforcement of antibalkanization in the opinions we have examined so far, we
are better situated (1) to abstract a principle whose content and application can
be evaluated; (2) to analyze and criticize the principle's application in particular
cases; (3) to probe the logic of the restrictions on race-conscious interventions
that antibalkanization often imposes; and (4) to consider how
antibalkanization might be applied in cases of concern to minority
communities, not involving challenges to civil rights laws.
A. Clarifying Antibalkanization's Normative Basis as an Equality Principle
Any evaluation of the balkanization opinions must begin with a simple call
for clarity. Remarkably, despite the many equal protection opinions raising
concerns about balkanization, the opinions have yet clearly to articulate how
antibalkanization is connected to equality. Do the opinions invoking concerns
about balkanization reason from their own substantive account of equality? Or
do antibalkanization opinions only impose a side constraint on the pursuit of
equality (government may pursue equality, however equality is understood, so
long as government acts in ways that do not unduly threaten social cohesion)?
The opinions upholding and limiting affirmative action do in fact seem to
reflect a substantive conception of equality, one sufficiently robust to lead race
moderates to break with conservatives and identify the pursuit of diversity as a
compelling government interest. Justice O'Connor's embrace of diversity can
be read as expressing a substantive conception of equality."' So, too, can we
21. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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read a commitment to equality in Justice Kennedy's insistence, in Parents
Involved, that government may engage in race-conscious, facially neutral action
in pursuit of "the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people
have equal opportunity regardless of their race." 21  We can read in these
statements of why government has constitutional reason to engage in race-
conscious action an antibalkanization conception of equality: that the
government may act to ensure that no group is so deeply marginalized as to
feel like an outsider or a nonparticipant, so long as government combats group
marginalization by means that do not unduly stimulate group resentment.1
(On this account, antibalkanization shares with antisubordination a concern
with social arrangements that communicate to some members of the
community that they are outsiders, while it shares with anticlassification a
concern with the experience of majority as well as minority groups.) If this
view is implicit or emergent in the opinions of race moderates, however, it has
not been articulated with sufficient clarity to establish with certainty the
substantive conception of equality on which the opinions rest. Clarifying the
substantive conception of equality that antibalkanization enforces is in turn
necessary to evaluate the interpretive and practical judgments that guide the
principle's vindication in particular cases.
213. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787-88 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see supra text
accompanying note 83.
214. On this view, Justices interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment are developing a cohesion-
related theory of equal protection, much as Justices interpreting the First Amendment have
developed a cohesion-related account of establishment. Social cohesion -and the potential
for political divisiveness- has long been a central concern of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 715
(2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (identifying as an important justification for "the ban on
establishment[] its inextricable link with social conflict"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 622 (1971) ("Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even
partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government,
but political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the
First Amendment was intended to protect."); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 216-17 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Designed to serve as perhaps the
most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people,
the public school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects.").
The equal protection opinions do not advert to the Establishment Clause opinions but
nonetheless might be influenced by them. Cf Pamela S. Karlan, Taking Politics Religiously:
Can Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Cases Illuminate the Law ofDemocracy?, 83 IND. L.J.
1, 15 (2008) (arguing that the Court understands the racial redistricting cases as involving "a
sort of establishment of race" but has been "reluctant . . . to do anything about the far more
pernicious 'establishment of party' achieved by partisan line-drawing").
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B. Evaluating Antibalkanization's Application in Particular Cases
Clarification of the principle guiding the opinions upholding and limiting
race-conscious civil rights initiatives is needed if we are to assess how the
Justices have enforced antibalkanization in particular cases and to consider
whether antibalkanization might shed new light on cases that race moderates
have never considered.
Consider the expressed concerns about balkanization that lead race
moderates to uphold and limit civil rights laws and initiatives. Does this use of
strict scrutiny in fact promote social cohesion? The race-conscious civil rights
laws that moderates strike down are often adopted by fragile coalitions
negotiating under severe political constraints; once invalidated, the policies
may never be reenacted or implemented in the form race moderates
recommend or permit. As importantly, doctrine undertaking to alleviate racial
resentments may in fact stimulate racial resentments. Myriad factors shape
promotion and admissions decisions, but a disappointed applicant only can get
strict judicial scrutiny if she expresses her aggrievement in racial terms; a strict
scrutiny doctrine thus has the capacity to aggravate as well as to diffuse racial
balkanization. For these reasons, the ultimate practical consequence of judicial
oversight of race-conscious interventions may be to destroy coalitions for
change and to entrench the racial status quo, even if this is not the judge's
purpose.
Even if concerns about social cohesion are an appropriate basis on which to
interpret the Equal Protection Clause, a mediating principle concerned with
cohesion might not be best vindicated through the strict scrutiny framework.
Progressives have invoked concerns of cohesion as a reason for applying
intermediate scrutiny, a more deferential standard of judicial oversight.' But
there is no reason to debate the question as a choice between strict and
intermediate scrutiny. While concerns about balkanization were first expressed
in disputes over the application of the tiers-of-scrutiny framework, concerns
about balkanization are not analytically dependent upon standards of review.
Judicial oversight that guards against balkanization could well be extended to
forms of state action presently subject to rational basis review- a possibility
this Article suggests in concluding.
215. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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C. Colorblind and Race-Conscious Concerns About the Form of Civil Rights
Interventions
Another undertheorized feature of antibalkanization opinions is the
function served by the limitations on race-conscious civil rights initiatives that
moderates have imposed. Over the decades, a bloc of conservative and
moderate Justices has voted to limit affirmative action and other race-conscious
remedies, often reasoning about race in abstract or formal terms that equate the
position of whites and minorities.2' Yet, ys we have seen, on a number of
occasions race moderates upholding and limiting these race-conscious
initiatives have acknowledged that "race matters.""' Even as Justice O'Connor
invoked formal accounts of race to justify applying strict scrutiny to affirmative
action in Adarand,"" she insisted that she could apply strict scrutiny in ways
that would differentiate between a law that segregates and integrates - between
a "no trespassing sign" and a "welcome mat.""'
What is the rationale for restricting race-conscious interventions that might
be advanced by Justices who vote to uphold and limit race-conscious state
action while acknowledging that race matters? Moderates have employed strict
scrutiny, not to bar all race-conscious efforts to integrate, but rather to impose a
particular social form on government's race-conscious efforts to integrate: to insist
that when government engages in a race-conscious act in support of
integration, government interacts with the public in ways that emphasize
commonality among citizens and minimize the appearance of racial
partiality.22 o
216. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Colorblind,"44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1991)
("[T]he Court relies increasingly on the formal-race concept of race, a vision of race as
unconnected to the historical reality of Black oppression."); Haney L6pez, supra note 22, at
lo61-62 ("One detects in current Supreme Court equality discourse a renewed penchant for
the racial formalism which in an earlier and ignominious version helped defend Jim Crow
oppression .. . . In this early incarnation, race-as-merely-color stripped the social meaning
of group debasement from segregation laws. In its recrudescence, an abstract, empty
conception of race insulates patterns of racial exclusion while linking Jim Crow and
affirmative action.").
217. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
218. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (calling for "consistency of
treatment irrespective of the race of the burdened or benefited group").
219. See supra note 6o.
220. In Bakke, Justice Powell seemed to equate the position of minority and majority groups but
then offered a framework in which government could engage in affirmative action, so long
as it proceeded in a form that emphasized commonality rather than difference among
applicants. I have described the dual character ofJustice Powell's formalism:
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Justices concerned with balkanization ask that when government engages
in a race-conscious act in support of integration, it proceed in ways that
diminish public engagement with these concerns. In Bakke,"' Justice Powell
emphasized commonality when he rejected remedial justifications for
educational affirmative action in favor of racial "diversity""2 and when he
imposed conditions on affirmative action, such as the requirements that
schools consider all applicants together and consider every applicant as an
individual."' Justice O'Connor followed this example, leading the Court to
impose constraints on affirmative action in Gratz 4 and Grutter2 s designed to
diminish the salience of race in the administration of the programs, as
commentators Robert Post and Neil Siegel have observed.226 Concern about
Justice Powell addressed members of the "dominant majority" as "minorities"
who needed courts to protect them from the discrimination that race-conscious
desegregation initiatives might inflict on them....
Yet Justice Powell's Bakke opinion accepted the analogy between the race
discrimination claims of majority and minority groups only to a point. In quiet
ways, Justice Powell understood that members of superordinate and subordinate
groups were differently situated, and in constitutionally significant ways. Even as
he rejected a race-asymmetric or antisubordination framework for interpreting
the presumption against racial classifications, Justice Powell offered the nation a
master compromise in the concept of "diversity" itself- a framework that would
allow limited voluntary race-conscious efforts at desegregation to continue, in a
social form that would preserve the Constitution as a domain of neutral
principles.
Siegel, supra note 7, at 1532; see also id. at 1538-42 (analyzing indirection in affirmative action
and discriminatory purpose doctrine).
221. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
222. Id. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("[T]he right [of a university] to select those students who
will contribute the most to the robust exchange of ideas ... is of paramount importance in
the fulfillment of its mission." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
223. Id. at 317-18.
224. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
225. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). O'Connor presents the limitations as designed to
allay the apprehension that affirmative action will harm nonminority applicants. See id. at
341 ("We agree that, in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity
contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does
not unduly harm nonminority applicants.").
226. Robert Post analyzes the restrictions as controlling the extent to which affirmative action
programs appear to make race salient in admissions decisions. See Post, supra note 59, at 75
("Even as it authorizes universities to establish affirmative action plans that produce a
critical mass of minority students, the Court prohibits these plans from utilizing procedures
or rules that symbolically convey the message that applicants are entitled to educational
benefits by virtue of their membership in a racial group. Here, as in other areas of equal
protection law, 'appearances do matter.' Racial inequalities can be addressed, but only in
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the racial meanings particular policies can communicate to citizens also seems
to animate the constitutional distinction that Justice Kennedy drew in Parents
Involved127 between admissions policies that sort individual applicants by race
and administrative decisions that locate school districts with attention to the
demographics of the students who will attend.228 Both policies entail race-
conscious state action, but Justice Kennedy seemed concerned that making race
an express factor in individual school admissions decisions would make an
exclusionary meaning of race more salient to citizens than would the use of race
in the design of school districts."' In Ricci,23o this same instinct led Justice
Kennedy to differentiate between employer consideration of the racial disparate
impact of a testing device before administering the test, and after."' With a
historically informed appreciation of the difference in position of racial groups,
Justice Kennedy is clear that government may act in race-conscious ways to
promote equal opportunity for all, so long as government pursues these ends in
ways that efface the social salience of racial differences." (footnote omitted) (quoting Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)). Neil Siegel analyzes restrictions on race-based state
action as directly concerned with constraining policies and programs that have the potential
to provoke racial balkanization. See Siegel, supra note 59, at 787 ("My scrutiny of the case
law suggests that the type of individualized consideration required in a given context turns
on the Court's judgment about how the use of racial criteria is likely to impact racial
balkanization in America over the long run.").
227. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
228. Id. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("School boards
may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races
through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools [and] drawing
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods.").
229. Id. ("These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a
classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of
them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible."); cf Siegel, supra note 59, at
844 ("The primary way that school districts can render the use of race less overt in the
assignment process is in the drawing of attendance zones to increase integration."). If
administrative consideration of race in the design of school districts were sufficiently
pronounced so as to make race visible as a predominant factor in the districting process, this
too might be of constitutional concern to Justice Kennedy. Cf Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 916 (1995) ("The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence
of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose,
that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a
significant number of voters within or without a particular district. To make this showing, a
plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting
principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political
subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.").
230. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
231. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
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ways that do not make race so salient as to affront dignity and threaten
divisiveness."
In all these examples, moderates allow government to engage in race-
conscious efforts to integrate, providing that government proceeds in ways that
lower the salience of race in its interactions with the public. Antibalkanization,
as we have seen, is distinctively concerned about the appearance of race-
conscious interventions - the risk that race-conscious civil rights interventions
will heighten conflict or resentment.
The concerns that antibalkanization raises about the social form and
meaning of race-conscious interventions find echoes in conversations about
remedial interventions that unfold in progressive circles. Many progressives
advocate structuring government interventions so that they do not emphasize,
entrench, or construct group-differentiated identities."' Kenji Yoshino argues
232. See supra notes 81-90.
233. These advocates offer not one but many reasons for avoiding, where possible, government
interventions that reflect, express, or construct group-differentiated identities. There is a
considerable literature on the merits of structuring entitlements in targeted or more
universal forms. Compare, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE
INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 118-20 (1987) (criticizing targeted
programs as politically unsustainable), and Theda Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism:
Politically Viable Policies To Combat Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS
411, 414 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (arguing that "when U.S.
antipoverty efforts have featured policies targeted on the poor alone, they have not been
politically sustainable, and they have stigmatized and demeaned the poor" but that there is
"room . . . within certain universal policy frameworks for extra benefits and services that
disproportionately help less privileged people without stigmatizing them"), with Robert
Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty: An Alternative View, in
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra, at 437, 437-38 (arguing that certain entitlements may be
better administered through targeted programs). Feminists have debated the wisdom of
antidiscrimination regimes that single out pregnant employees because of the risk of
reifying stereotypes or inviting employer backlash against female applicants. See Lucinda M.
Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1142-48 (198 6 ) (summarizing the debate between "equal treatment"
theorists who believe that pregnant employees should be treated the same as employees with
other potentially disabling conditions and "special treatment" theorists who argue that
special policies covering pregnancy are needed to ensure equality). Queer theorists have
questioned the forms of identity that antidiscrimination regimes construct. See, e.g., JANET
HAILEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY To TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2oo6). For a
critical race theorist cognizant of these same risks, see RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACE
CULTURE: A CRITIQUE (2005). See also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race
Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455 (2002)
(analyzing arguments of progressives who advocate resisting racial categories); Mary D.
Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-"Alien" Laws and Unity-Rebuilding
Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905 (exploring benefits and costs
of limiting anti-alien legislation that do not directly address antidiscrimination concerns).
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that universalizing appeals to liberty might serve as the "new equal protection"
in a society of increasing pluralism.234 Nancy Fraser advocates redressing group
inequalities through "transformative remedies" that destabilize conventional
understandings of group identity, rather than "affirmative remedies" that
further entrench conventional understandings of group identity.3 Understood
as a concern about the form of government interventions under conditions of
social conflict, antibalkanization's impulse to channel race-conscious
interventions into universalizing forms might be, or might grow to be, a
"transformative remedy" designed to cultivate the new understandings of race
that a constitutional democracy needs in order to sustain social commitments
to equal opportunity in an epoch of racial transition.
Antibalkanization's concern about preserving social cohesion in an epoch of
racial transition raises hard and fraught issues for antisubordination theory.
Given that, in a constitutional democracy, equal opportunity must ultimately
find its grounds in popular assent, not judicial decree, there are
antisubordination theorists who have explored the relation of cohesion and
equality."' Work of this kind might supply reasons, internal to
antisubordination theory, to structure remedial interventions in terms that
For a skeptical account of the universalist turn, see Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality?
Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (on file
with author).
234. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARv. L. REv. 747 (2011).
235. See NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE POSTSOCIALIST
CONDITION 26 (1997) ("Whereas affirmative remedies can have the perverse effect of
promoting class differentiation, transformative remedies tend to blur it.").
236. There are antisubordination theorists who consider questions of cohesion for reasons
internal to antisubordination theory itself. See Richard T. Ford, Hopeless Constitutionalism,
Hopeful Pragmatism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 143, 151-52 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2009) ("I suspect that the best-perhaps the only-way to frame a broad
constitutional vision that will both appeal to a majority of Americans and satisfy traditional
left-liberal objectives ... will be to tell a story that emphasizes what joins us as a political
community."); Michelman, supra note 162, at 1397 ("In South Africa, to paraphrase John
Ely, redistributive social programs all must emanate from a nonwhite, political-majority we
for the benefit of a racially identifiable us at the apparent expense of a racially identifiable
them. How will the law respond?" (footnote omitted)); Siegel, supra note 7, at 1545-46 ("[A]
court seeking to intervene in a status order must make judgments about when and how to
proceed, knowing that, in the end, it cannot secure systemic change through brute force;
efforts to transform a society through constitutional adjudication require the political
confidence and consent of the very groups a court would subject to the force of law. The
groups whose social privilege law circumscribes may object, vociferously; but they must, in
the end, recognize the Constitution to which they are subject as their law, or it will lack
authority as law."); see also Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1294 ("A pluralist democracy needs
emerging groups to commit to its processes just as much as it needs established groups to
stick to those processes.").
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affirm commonality rather than emphasize difference. Yet many critical race
theorists remain deeply skeptical of any doctrine suggesting equal protection
solicitude for the racially privileged or expressing a "post-racial" equivalence in
position between majority and minority group members," especially where
the practical consequence of the restriction is to impose constitutional
limitations on the scope of remedial interventions.
These expressive and practical concerns have weight. One cannot assess
doctrines requiring government to govern through forms that emphasize racial
inclusion and commonality without knowing more about the larger doctrinal
framework of which the requirement is a part. In particular doctrinal
frameworks and practical settings, requiring race-conscious government
interventions to assume universalizing forms can preserve inequality;"" in
others, the requirement may promote cohesion and integration. Skepticism
about this feature of antibalkanization opinions seems warranted so long as
antibalkanization opinions focus exclusively, as they now seem to, on the
constitutionality of civil rights laws and initiatives.
Even if antibalkanization supplies reasons to uphold as well as to limit
affirmative action, disparate impact laws, and percent plans-and so might be
understood as responsive to the potential estrangement of minority as well as
majority groups - antibalkanization continues to function in the service of
policing civil rights remedies. But nothing intrinsic to the antibalkanization
inquiry would seem to require this. Indeed, if antibalkanization is a principle of
transcontextual application, it should be enforced in ways that are at least as
responsive to practices and conditions of concern to minority as to majority
communities. An antibalkanization principle could ultimately supply reasons
for revising other aspects of equal protection doctrine. I close with some
thoughts about what it might mean to apply an antibalkanization principle in a
new doctrinal context, not involving the constitutionality of a civil rights
initiative.
237. See Cho, supra note 163, at 1589 (analyzing "postracialism as an ideology that both converges
and departs from its predecessor 'colorblindness"' and "identify[ing] four key features of
the revamped ideology (racial progress or transcendence, race neutral universalism, moral
equivalence, and political distancing)"). For conservative use of post-racial discourse, see
supra note 2 and accompanying text (quoting the Tea Party's petition to the NAACP, cited
supra note 2).
238. See Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 23, at 1113 (analyzing
dynamics of "preservation-through-transformation").
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D. Transporting the Logic ofReverse Discrimination Cases to New Contexts
The equal protection framework that we now have focuses judicial
oversight on race-conscious remedies - when race-conscious remedies are surely
not the only form of state action with potential to engender racial resentment
or exacerbate racial balkanization. In the decades after Brown, the Court's equal
protection docket was populated by minority plaintiffs. But today, the Court's
race discrimination cases are almost exclusively brought by white plaintiffs
invoking doctrines of strict scrutiny to challenge civil rights laws. This is not
accidental. The complexion of the Court's equal protection docket tells us
something about the Court's equal protection doctrine. Courts have defined
what counts as a group-based classification and what counts as discriminatory
purpose in such a way as to make it exceedingly hard for minorities and
women to craft equal protection challenges to race- and gender-salient laws."'
Ironically (or not), it is now conservatives who are bringing innovative equal
protection challenges to facially neutral laws and developing new and
expansive conceptions of discriminatory purpose to attack civil rights
legislation whose constitutionality they never questioned for decades. '
A hopeful place to conclude this Article would be to reflect on what equal
protection doctrine might look like were the antibalkanization principle
vindicated in an equal protection framework that focused judicial review on a
different class of problems -so that the antibalkanization inquiry was applied
to laws and practices that potentially estrange minority as well as majority
communities. Today, the Court insists that all racial classifications are subject
to strict scrutiny."' Yet government continues to employ racial criteria in
239. On the development of discriminatory purpose doctrine, see supra notes 92-95. See also
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 23. On the inconsistent, or absent,
definition of a "racial classification," see infra note 243 and accompanying text.
240. For new approaches to challenging facially neutral laws, see supra notes 143-144, which
discuss the theories of Justice Scalia and of Professor Kenneth Marcus, who headed the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights under President Bush. For evidence of the shift in conservative
claims about the constitutionality of race-conscious, facially neutral laws, see supra notes 91-
1o8, 135-136 and accompanying text. See also THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST
SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATIVISM 7 (2004)
(presenting a political history of "the emergence of conservative activism" in the Rehnquist
Court).
241. In Bakke, Justice Powell emphasized:
The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. Its language
is explicit: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." . . . The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
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crucial contexts not subject to strict judicial oversight, for example, in
apprehending criminal suspects.
Why is the Court's docket not inundated by minority plaintiffs challenging
government's use of race in suspect apprehension, as well as by majority
plaintiffs challenging government's use of race in affirmative action programs?
While there is widespread agreement that racial profiling violates the Equal
Protection Clause, courts have universally agreed that the use of race as part of
suspect description does not constitute a racial classification and therefore does
not require strict scrutiny to determine its compliance with the Fourteenth
Amendment. The cases agree that the use of race in suspect apprehension is not
a racial classification4' but offer no coherent explanation why.' However one
person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is
not equal.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). Justice O'Connor repeatedly
quoted from this statement in her own equal protection opinions. See Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218 (1995); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,494 (1989) (plurality opinion).
242. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337-38 (2d Cir. 2000) ("In acting on the
description provided by the victim of the assault-a description that included race as one of
several elements -defendants did not engage in a suspect racial classification that would
draw strict scrutiny. The description, which originated not with the state but with the
victim, was a legitimate classification within which potential suspects might be found.... In
this case, plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege discriminatory intent."); United States v.
Avery, 137 F-3d 343, 354 n.5 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that "the decision to investigate
someone [of a particular race] based on a tip from a source outside the police organization
(e.g., cab driver, gate agent)" does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); United States v.
Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Obviously race or ethnic background may become
a legitimate consideration when investigators have information on this subject about a
particular suspect."); Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan, Defining
Racial Profiling in a Post-September ii World, 4o AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1195, 1215 (2003)
("Although race, ethnicity, or national origin should not be used based on the perception of
a general or circumstantial correlation between race and crime, an exception is created when
a specific past crime has been committed and a victim or witness provides a detailed physical
description of the perpetrator that includes race, nationality, or ethnicity as one of multiple
characteristics that can narrow the field of suspects."); David Rudovsky & R. Richard
Banks, Debate, Racial Profiling and the War on Terror, 155 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 173,
178 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=5 ("The use of race as a
component of a suspect description is a widespread and accepted practice that no court has
ever regarded as racially discriminatory, much less prohibited." (opening statement of
Rudovsky)).
243. Cf Balkin & Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition, supra note 23 (analyzing
inconsistencies in defining what is a "racial classification" that triggers strict scrutiny); id. at
27 ("Courts currently reason that the state may employ race in suspect descriptions so long
as race is not the sole factor used to detain suspects. The same rationale once shielded
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answers that question, it cannot be by appeal to a definition of a racial
classification enunciated by the Supreme Court because, to date, the Court has
never defined what a racial classification is. In making these observations, my
concern is not to extend strict scrutiny to the use of race in suspect
apprehension but rather to question the development of a bifurcated
framework of judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause that (1) focuses
all judicial oversight on a narrow class of "racial classification" cases, while
(2) offering almost no judicial oversight to all other claims of race
discrimination, especially when (3) that bifurcated framework offers no
rigorous transcontextual criteria for determining what forms of state action
count as "racial classifications" and thus warrant rigorous review.
Imagine, by contrast, a framework of equal protection review that
recognized the role, and responsibility, of coequal branches of government in
vindicating equal protection values -a framework that invited courts to listen
to the representative branches of government when they sought legislatively to
enforce equal protection values, without abdicating a court's role in
guaranteeing to all persons the equal protection of the laws. Such a framework
affirmative action programs from invalidation . . . . Courts now look upon all affirmative
action programs with suspicion, even if race is only one factor.").
Within the last decade, however, some have begun to question the distinction between
racial profiling and suspect descriptions and to ask whether the refusal to characterize the
use of race in suspect descriptions as a racial classification can be justified. See, e.g.,
R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and
Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1109 (2001) ("To conclude that race-based suspect
descriptions should not be treated as a racial classification because they seem useful or
justified would be to engage in precisely the sort of threshold substantive evaluation that the
doctrinal structure forecloses, and that the Supreme Court has explicitly disavowed.");
Priyamvada Sinha, Police Use of Race in Suspect Descriptions: Constitutional Considerations,
31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 131, 178-79 (2006) (arguing that "the costs of applying the
Equal Protection Clause may be outweighed by its many benefits"); R. Richard Banks, The
Illusion of Colorblindness in Antidiscrimination Law (2008) (unpublished manuscript at 4),
available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= looo&context= r banks
("Facilitative accommodation, suspect description reliance and race-based casting, for
example, are so widely accepted that they could not be categorically prohibited.... Thus,
the doctrine can only appear to presume the invalidity of all racial classifications by,
ironically, exempting some racial classifications from strict scrutiny. The law cannot become
colorblind as long as our society remains so race conscious."); Rudovsky & Banks, supra
note 242, at 178-79 ("The distinction between (permissible) suspect description reliance and
(impermissible) profiling is especially fuzzy in the antiterrorism context. Many antiterrorism
measures assailed by some as racial profiling might be viewed by others as permissible uses
of suspect descriptions. Currently, law enforcement agents may be seeking hundreds, or
even thousands, of individuals -predominantly Arab or Muslim men-who are suspected of
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would not be sharply bifurcated, with all laws presumptively constitutional
except those employing racial classifications. Instead, doctrine would invite
dialogue between courts and legislatures in a greater range of cases.' A
concern about balkanization could shape development of that equal protection
framework.
Consider one hypothetical case - a reverse "reverse discrimination" claim.
An equal protection framework that was evenhandedly responsive to concerns
of balkanization would worry about particular practices of suspect
apprehension that estrange minority communities,"5 as it has worried about
244. See Balkin & Siegel, Remembering How To Do Equality, supra note 23, at 99-104 (proposing
revisions in the equal protection framework for 2020, including, in the area of judicial
constitutionalism, doctrines that would reorient equal protection law away from its
preoccupation with formal classification, doctrines promoting the sharing of responsibility
between courts and the political branches, and doctrines relying on jurisdictional
redundancy in a federal system).
245. Law enforcement's overreliance on race in suspect descriptions has caused racial grievance
among minority groups in numerous cases. Black students at SUNY College at Oneonta, for
example, expressed tremendous anger and frustration when, based on a witness's
description of a suspect as a young African-American male with a cut on his hand, the
Oneonta police attempted to question every black man in the city, regardless of age, and at
least one black woman. See, e.g., Jim Mulvaney, College Dragnet for Black Blasted, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 12, 1992, at 5 ("'They came to my dorm, asked me where I was the night before and
demanded to see my hands,' said Dan Sontag, 22, a junior from Scotia majoring in business.
'I was scared, but I just figured it was a simple mistake . . . It wasn't until later I learned it
was every black male that I got furious."' (ellipsis in original)); id. ("'It is very discouraging
to live in an environment where you can be harassed like that,' said Clement Mallory, 22, a
political science student from Park Slope, Brooklyn, who also was questioned. 'You don't
see them questioning every white man every time somebody commits a crime."').
Muslim, Arab, and South Asian Americans selectively targeted by post-9/11 programs
such as the National Security Entry-Exit Registration Program based on their race,
ethnicity, or national origin report mistrust of law enforcement. See NICOLE J. HENDERSON
ET AL., LAW ENFORCEMENT & ARAB AME1UCAN COMMUNITY RELATIONS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11,
2001: ENGAGEMENT IN A TIME OF UNCERTAINTY 13, 21-22 (20o6), available at
http://www.vera.org/content/law-enforcement-and-arab-american-community-relations-
after-september-11-2001-engagement-tim.pdf (showing that Arab-Americans most
frequently cite immigration enforcement and racial profiling by law enforcement as the
main concerns of their community and distrust of law enforcement as the top barrier to
better relations with local and federal law enforcement). Latinos selectively targeted by
immigration enforcement in part based on appearance exhibit similar mistrust of law
enforcement and racial grievance. See Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A
Proposal for Ending Racial Profiling in Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINo L. REV.
1, 10 (2005) ("[R]ace-conscious police tactics have subjected Latinos to severe emotional
stress, caused them to alter their behavior to avoid police scrutiny, perpetuated stereotypes
regarding supposedly 'Hispanic' characteristics, cast Latinos as foreigners, hampered
relations between the community and law enforcement, and brought into question the
legitimacy of the justice system."). See generally Jeffrey Fagan, Introduction to Symposium,
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particular forms of race-conscious remedies that estrange majority
communities, and perhaps would not rely on strict scrutiny in either case. In
neither case is judicial control needed; judicial dialogue is. In our hypothetical
reverse "reverse discrimination" case, courts concerned with balkanization
might prompt the representative branches to explore new practices of suspect
apprehension that might make domestic and international security more
equitable and effective." Whether judges decided to act through classification
or discriminatory purpose doctrine seems less important than their deciding to
provide some sort of equal protection oversight, an incentive that would
prompt the political branches to rein in the kinds of suspect apprehension
practices that most alienate minority communities."' Judges concerned about
balkanization might creatively devise a doctrinal device that provides the
appropriate mix of judicial oversight and deference to the political branches.4
Legitimacy and Criminal justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 123, 123 ("[S]urveys show that more
than one in three Whites have little confidence in the police, compared to more than half of
Black respondents." (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 119 (1996), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook,/
pdf/sb1996/sb1996-section2.pdf)).
246. Minority groups who perceive procedural injustice in police practices are less likely to view
law enforcement as legitimate and engage in cooperation. See Fagan, supra note 245, at 127
("There are longstanding grievances between minority citizens and the police that give rise
to anger and suspicion on the one hand, and ambivalence on the other." (footnote
omitted)); Tom R. Tyler, Stephen J. Schulhofer & Aziz R. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence
Effects in Counter-Terrorism Policing: A Study ofMuslim Americans 2 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.,
Working Paper No. 296, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 10-15 2010) ("Judgments
about procedural justice have been found to influence the perceived legitimacy of law
enforcement and thus to affect willingness to comply and to cooperate . . . To win this battle
the government must win legitimacy by displaying fairness.").
247. See supra note 245.
248. So long as all racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, courts will refrain from
recognizing that the use of race in suspect descriptions is a racial classification. The judges of
the Second Circuit conducted a revealing debate about this question in the course of
concluding not to hear the Oneonta decision en banc. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d
769 (2d Cit. 2000) (denial of rehearing en banc); see id. at 786-87 (Calabresi, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) ("The problem is that the strict scrutiny criteria developed
by the Supreme Court are much too blunt. If an action is deemed a racial classification, it is
very difficult, under the Supreme Court precedents, ever to justify it. And, were such
justification made easier in cases of police following a victim's description, the spillover to
other racial classification contexts would be highly undesirable. In other words, were the
requirements of strict scrutiny to be relaxed in the police/victim's description area, it would
be hard indeed to keep them from also being weakened in other areas in which racial
classifications ought virtually never to be countenanced. If, instead, following victim racial
descriptions by the police were not deemed to be, at least potentially, racial classifications,
there would be no constitutional impediment on police sweeps [that most would agree
involve illegitimate uses of race]. For these, and other similar reasons, courts should
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Needed is judicial empathy for citizens who are estranged by racialized
encounters with government -empathy of the kind that led courts to develop
heightened scrutiny of affirmative action law.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, concern about minority communities' potential
estrangement has led race moderates on the Court to preserve civil rights
initiatives that race conservatives would prohibit. Justices citing concerns about
balkanization have upheld affirmative action, subject to constitutional
constraints."' 9 Citing concerns about balkanization, Justice Kennedy has
emphasized that government has race-conscious, facially neutral ways to
achieve an equal opportunity society2 so and explained that employers can
consider the racial disparate impact of a selection measure before administering
a promotion test, but not after."' As this Article has shown, balkanization
provides race moderates reasons to uphold as well as to limit disparate impact
law, just as it provides race moderates reasons to uphold as well as to limit
affirmative action law. 252
But however important preserving existing civil rights initiatives from
judicial invalidation may be, preserving existing civil rights initiatives from
judicial invalidation is not sufficient to demonstrate equal solicitude for
majority and minority communities. Many will doubt that antibalkanization
values community- rather than particular communities-so long as the
Supreme Court's equal protection doctrine and docket continue to be
dominated by the claims of white plaintiffs.
Will the antibalkanization principle be vindicated in ways that entrench
historical injustice-or that forge bonds of identity and empathy that a
community needs to transcend historical injustice? Is the concern about social
recognize severe limitations on their competence to deal with victim racial descriptions. But
limitations do not mean impotence, they mean that courts ought to be reluctant to act alone.
Rather, courts should encourage legislatures to develop guidelines for this area. Such
legislative guidelines could make nuanced distinctions between what is needed and
acceptable police behavior, and what is not. Courts could then both enforce those
guidelines, and if a jurisdiction made distinctions that were inadequately sensitive, perhaps
even strike some of them down.").
249. See supra Part I.
250. See supra Part II.
2S1. See supra Sections III.C-D.
252. See supra Section III.E.
1365
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 120:1278 2011
cohesion expressed in several decades of Supreme Court cases an alternative to
race equality-or a predicate of it?
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